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MILKOVICH V. LORAINJOURNAL CO.-DEMISE OF THE OPINION
PRIVILEGE IN DEFAMATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a strong commitment to freedom of speech,
as embodied in the first amendment of the Constitution: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... .I At the same time, society has always viewed a person's reputa-
tion as worthy of protection from defamatory statements. 2 The law of
defamation brings these two values into sharp conflict.3 The United
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Shakespeare emphasized the importance of a person's reputation in
Othello, where lago tells Othello:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, act III, scene 3 (2d ed. 1966).
Approximately 400 years later, Justice Stewart articulated the Supreme
Court's recognition of the same concept when he stated: "The right of a man to
the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered lib-
erty." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Defamation consists of the "twin torts" of libel and slander. W.P. KEE-
TON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. A de-
tailed discussion of the complicated law of defamation is beyond the scope of
this Note. The reader may, however, find the following summary of the "black
letter law" of defamation as contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts to be a
useful background to this Note.
In order for there to be a cause of action for defamation, there must be:
(1) "a false and defamatory statement concerning another;" (2) "an unprivileged
publication to a third party;" (3) some form of culpability on the part of the
publisher; and (4) "either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. For a
discussion of the falsity requirement, see infra note 153. To be defamatory, a
communication must "tend[] so to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associat-
ing or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, § 559. In determining
whether a communication has a defamatory meaning, the court will consider the
meaning to be that which the recipient "correctly, or mistakenly but reason-
ably," believed to have been intended. Id. § 563. To ascertain whether the
plaintiff was the subject of the communication, a court will also consider the
recipient's correct, or mistaken but reasonable, understanding. Id. § 564. The
element of publication will be satisfied when there has been an intentional or
(647)
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States Supreme Court has strived to achieve a balance between the two
in a series of decisions since 1964 when, in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,4 the Court employed the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution to give "freedoms of expression ... the 'breathing space' that
they 'need ... to survive.' ",5
The Court's most recent foray into the constitutional balancing re-
quired in freedom of speech/defamation cases came in Milkovich v. Lo-
rain Journal Co.6 The issue in Milkovich was whether a constitutional
privilege existed for those defamatory statements classified as state-
ments of "opinion." 7 Many lower courts had recognized an opinion
privilege following the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,8 which contained dictum that the lower courts interpreted as man-
dating such a privilege. 9 The Milkovich Court held that lower courts had
incorrectly recognized such a privilege,' 0 and noted four factors in ex-
isting constitutional doctrine which already adequately protected state-
ments based on opinion: (1) in certain situations, the defamatory
statement must be provable as false to be actionable; (2) in certain situa-
tions, the speaker must be culpable for the defamatory statement to be
actionable; (3) statements must appear to state actual facts, unlike rheto-
negligent communication to someone other than the person defamed, including
intentional and unreasonable failure to remove a defamatory communication
that one knows is exhibited on his land or chattels. Id. § 577.
A defamatory communication will be either libelous or slanderous. See id.
§ 568 comment b. Libel consists essentially of written or printed words or other
embodiment in physical form, while slander is composed of spoken words "or
any other form of communication other than those stated in [the subsection de-
fining libel]." Id. § 568.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a full discussion of New York Times, see infra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
5. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)). The Court held that a state defamation law which allowed
recovery for libel against a public official in the absence of proof of injury, fal-
sity, malice or damages violated the first and fourteenth amendments by not
providing sufficient protection for freedom of speech. Id. at 264. The Court
found that such protection would be provided by requiring a finding of "actual
malice" as a prerequisite to recovery-a finding that the speaker acted with
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." Id. at 279-80. For a further discussion of New York Times, see
infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other major
Supreme Court decisions evidencing the constitutionalization of defamation, see
infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
6. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). For a full discussion of Milkovich, see infra notes
126-86 and accompanying text.
7. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a full discussion of the source and the subse-
quent development of the opinion privilege, see infra notes 89-125 and accom-
panying text.
9. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. For a discussion of the dictum on which the
lower courts relied, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
10. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. The Court termed the lower courts' reli-
ance on the Gertz dictum to be "mistaken." Id.
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tic or hyperbole, to be actionable; and (4) independent appellate review
of findings of actual malice provides an additional safeguard for free-
dom of speech. "1 The Court stated that these factors, rather than "an
artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact," should guide the lower
courts in determining whether a particular statement merits
protection. 12
This Note will examine the impact of the Milkovich decision on the
law of defamation, first tracing the law of defamation from its ancient
roots through to the development of the fair comment privilege, the his-
torical predecessor to the opinion privilege. 13 This Note will further
review the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of the law of defama-
tion and examine the opinion privilege that lower courts developed in
response to Supreme Court decisions.14 The impact of Milkovich will be
discussed with an emphasis on the ramifications of both abolishing the
opinion privilege and requiring lower courts to apply Milkovich's broad
policy statements rather than the bright-line opinion/fact tests previ-
ously in use.' 5 This Note will then conclude that if the lower courts
attempt to perceive and apply a new bright-line test based on the gen-
eral Milkovich principles, the result may be that statements which the
Court intended to be protected will instead be deemed actionable, thus
unintentionally contracting the scope of protected communications. 16
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the opinion privilege as it stands today one
must trace the development of defamation, particularly in medieval Eng-
land, and the opinion privilege's first articulation in the fair comment
privilege.
A. History of Defamation
The roots of defamation may be traced back as far as the days of
Moses, and the principle that damage to another's reputation justified
sanctions continued into more modern cultures.17 The Roman code of
11. Id. at 2706-07. For a further discussion of the factors articulated by the
Court, see infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
12. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
13. For a discussion of the history of defamation, see infra notes 17-46 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the fair comment privilege, see infra
notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of the law
of defamation, see infra notes 61-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the opinion privilege, see infra notes 89-125 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the potential impact of Milkovich, see infra notes 207-
09 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the possible outcomes under the Milkovich princi-
ples, see infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
17. M. NEWELL, DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER ch. 1, § 1, at 2 (1890).
Examples of Mosaic laws proscribing defamation are found in the Bible. One of
6491991] NOTE
3
West: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. - Demise of the Opinion Privilege
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Twelve Tables punished defamation, as did the primitive codes of
the Teutonic races. 18 Ancient penalties indicate both the seriousness
with which these early cultures viewed defamation and the underlying
importance of a person's reputation. Penalties ranged from the pay-
ment of a set sum 19 to public humiliation 20 or loss of the slanderer's
tongue.2 1
The law of defamation as we know it today began to take on its
current shape in medieval England. Although libel and slander are
known today as the "twin torts" of defamation, 2 2 they had very different
beginnings. 23
the Ten Commandments reads: "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy
neighbour." Exodus 20:16 (King James). Shortly thereafter, the Book of Exodus
commands: "Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with the
wicked to be an unrighteous witness." Exodus 23:1 (KingJames).
18. M. NEWELL, supra note 17, ch. 1, § 4, at 6 (discussing code of Twelve
Tables); Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries-Part 1,
40 LAW Q. REV. 302, 303-04 (1924) ("The primitive codes of the Anglo-Saxons
and other Teutonic races, like the primitive code of the Twelve Tables, punished
defamatory words .... " (footnotes omitted)).
19. See Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 303 n.8; Veeder, The History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation-Part 1, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 548 (1903). Under the Lex
Salica, the tribal law of the ancient Salian Franks, calling a man "wolf" or "hare"
would cost the speaker three shillings; falsely accusing a woman of unchastity
carried a much steeper rate of forty-five shillings. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at
303 n.8; Veeder, supra, at 548; see also M. SMITH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN
LAW 124-29 (reprint ed. 1979) (discussing Lex Salica and other Germanic tribal
laws).
20. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 303 n.8; Veeder, supra note 19, at 548.
The Norman Costumal not only charged the speaker with damages, but required
him to publicly confess himself a liar while holding his nose with his fingers.
Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 303 n.8; Veeder, supra note 19, at 548.
21. M. NEWELL, supra note 17, ch. 1, § 15, at 19 ("King Alfred commanded
that the forger of slander should have his tongue cut out, unless he redeemed it
by the price of his head."); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond. An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1350
(1975) ("A millenium [sic] ago a slanderer could lose his tongue."); Veeder,
supra note 19, at 549 (noting that under King Alfred, slanderer would lose his
tongue).
22. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, § 111, at 771. Courts and commen-
tators have continuously pointed out the confusing state of the law of defama-
tion. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 740, 98 P. 281, 291 (1908)
(referring to law of defamation as "fog of fictions, inferences and presump-
tions"); Eaton, supra note 21, at 1350 (calling defamation "a forest of complexi-
ties, overgrown with anomalies, inconsistencies, and perverse rigidities"); Book
Review, 6 Am. L. REV. 593, 593 (1872) (reviewingJ. TOWNSEND, A TREATISE ON
THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL, AND ON THE REMEDY BY CIVIL ACTION
FOR THOSE WRONGS (2d ed. 1872)) (pointing out that law of defamation is "be-
set with questions of a perplexing character" and without any "general principle
for its foundation").
23. For a discussion of the law of defamation and the differences between
the current laws of libel and slander, see supra note 3.
[Vol. 36: p. 647650
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1. Slander
Actions for slander were common in England throughout the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries in local courts such as the seignorial and
manorial courts. 24 Although "great men of the realm" such as dukes
and barons could bring an action for defamation in the King's courts,
this right was initially unavailable to the common people.25 Commoners
could either bring their action in the local courts or in the ecclesiastical
courts,2 6 where defamation was punished as a sin. 2 7 The local courts
24. See Eaton, supra note 21, at 1350 ("actions for slander became common
in the English seignorial courts" in thirteenth century); Holdsworth, supra note
18, at 304 ("manorial and other local Courts gave remedies" for defamation);
Veeder, supra note 19, at 549 (defamation actions common during thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries in seignorial courts).
25. See Carr, The English Law of Defamation-Part 1, 18 LAw Q REV. 255, 260-
63 (1902); Book Review, supra note 22, at 604-05. In 1275, the first of the Stat-
utes de Scandalis Magnatum was passed, providing civil and criminal remedies
in the King's courts for "great men of the realm" who had been defamed. Carr,
supra, at 260-61. The civil remedy was rarely used by the "great men," id. at 262,
and the statute afforded no remedy whatsoever to commoners. Book Review,
supra note 22, at 605.
For the better among [the King's subjects] it seemed an ignoble thing
to approve their worship otherwise than in the duel; while for the mass
of the population the King's Courts were very far off, and, moreover, a
cheaper, a more familiar, and perhaps a more trusted competing juris-
diction [existed] at their very doors [-the seignorial jurisdiction].
Carr, supra, at 263; see also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 409-
10 (3d ed. rewritten 1923); Veeder, supra note 19, at 554; Book Review, supra
note 22, at 604-05.
26. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 410. Holdsworth reported:
Unless the case fell within the provisions of [the Statutes de
Scandalis Magnatum] the courts of common law declined to give any
action for defamatory words .... For defamation pure and simple the
plaintiff was obliged to resort either to the local courts, which ... freely
entertained such cases, or to the ecclesiastical courts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
27. See R. SMOLLA, LAw OF DEFAMATION § 1.02[l] (1990). Smolla described
the ceremony as follows: "The sinner would be wrapped in a white shroud and
required to kneel in public, holding a lighted candle and acknowledging his false
witness before the priest and parish wardens, begging the pardon of God and
the injured party." Id. (citing L. ELDREDGE, THE LAw OF DEFAMATION § 3, at 5
(1978)); see also Veeder, supra note 19, at 551 ("The usual ecclesiastical penance
for the offence was an acknowledgement of the baselessness of the imputation,
in the vestry room in the presence of the clergyman and church wardens of the
parish, and an apology to the person defamed."); Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
291, 308 (1983) ("Ecclesiastical law remedied defamation by imposing on the
defamer the penance of public admission of the baselessness of his or her state-
ments."). Professor Lovell added that after the ceremony the sinner would be
absolved. If he remained unrepentant, however, he could then be excommuni-
cated. If he still refused to repent, the ecclesiastical court could order seizure of
his worldly goods. Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15
VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (1962); see also 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED
TORTS ch. 1, 4, at 2 (1969) (in extreme cases, excommunication could be im-
posed as punishment).
NOTE
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fell into decay in the sixteenth century, and only then did the King's
courts begin to entertain commoners' actions for defamation. 28 A battle
for jurisdiction over the commoners' actions then developed between
the King's courts and the ecclesiastical courts.29 The King's courts were
popular with many people due to the availability of damages, which were
unavailable in the ecclesiastical courts5 ° If one wanted an ecclesiastical
penalty such as forcing penance on the defamer, however, the defama-
tion action needed to be brought in the ecclesiastical courts. 3 1
Over time, a more systematic method developed for determining
which court had jurisdiction. If the statement implied a merely spiritual
offense, the appropriate forum was the ecclesiastical courts.3 2 If the de-
famatory statement fit into a per se category, such as the imputation of a
criminal offense, the defamed person could bring an action in the King's
court without alleging special damages. 3 3 It was also possible to bring a
The ecclesiastical courts had borrowed their law of defamation from Roman
law. See Veeder, supra note 19, at 550-51. In Roman law, there were two laws
used to punish defamation-the relatively mild law of injuria, meaning insult,
and the more severe law of libellusfamosus. Carr, The English Law of Defamation-
Part 2, 18 LAw Q. REV. 388, 393 (1902); Veeder, supra note 19, at 563. The
ecclesiastical courts adopted the law of injuria, while the Star Chamber adopted
the law of libellusfamosus to govern actions for libel. Id. at 550, 565. For a discus-
sion of the Star Chamber's application of the law of libellusfamosus to libel ac-
tions, see infra note 40. Eventually, the class of "[r]eproachful language which
lessened one's good fame . . .grew in ecclesiastical law [from injuria] into the
distinct title 'diffimation.' " Veeder, supra note 19, at 551; see also Book Review,
supra note 22, at 599.
28. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 304; Veeder, supra note 19, at 547, 549-
50, 556. Commentators differ in their estimations as to when in the sixteenth
century the common law courts began their frequent involvement with defama-
tion. Estimates range over the span of the century. See Holdsworth, supra note
18, at 304 ("It was not till the beginning of the sixteenth century that the Com-
mon Law Courts began to compete with the Ecclesiastical Courts... by allowing
an action on the case for defamation."). But see R. SMOLLA, supra note 27,
§ 1.02[1] ("By the late sixteenth century the common law courts had begun to
assert jurisdiction for defamation."); Veeder, supra note 19, at 549-50 ("When,
at length, late in the sixteenth century, actions for defamation became common
in the king's courts, the manorial courts were in their decay.").
29. Veeder, supra note 19, at 551. "[T]he rivalry between the secular and
spiritual jurisdictions began" shortly after "a historic ordinance commanding
that no bishop or archdeacon should thereafter hold pleas relative to ecclesiasti-
cal matters ... in the county court." Id.
30. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 304; see also Veeder, supra note 19, at 552.
Veeder wrote: "[I]t is surprising that injured persons should have been content
so long with the very limited satisfaction of seeing their defamers doing penance
in a white sheet. Th[is] consideration[] doubtless contributed towards the ulti-
mately successful aggression of the king's courts." Id. (footnote omitted).
31. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 304. For a discussion of the various
forms of ecclesiastical penalties, see supra note 27.
32. Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries-Part 2,
40 LAw Q. REV. 397, 399 (1924). Examples of a spiritual offense would include
"call[ing] another 'heretic and one of the new learning,' or adulterer." Id.
33. Id. at 398-99. There were essentially three per se categories at the time:
(1) statements imputing "commission of a criminal offense punishable by impris-
652 [Vol. 36: p. 647
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defamation action in the King's court "if it could be proved that tempo-
ral loss had been occasioned."' 34 Eventually, the King's courts absorbed
the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts just as they had absorbed that
of the seignorial courts.3 5 Therefore, by the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the law of slander was much as we know it today. Certain catego-
ries of defamatory statements were actionable even if the plaintiff had
not sustained any special damage, while communications outside those
categories were only actionable where temporal harm had been
shown.3 6 The law of libel, on the other hand, was developing along very
different lines.
2. Libel
While the tort of slander was developing through the local, ecclesi-
astical and King's courts, actions for libel were developing in the Court
of the Star Chamber.3 7 The advent of the printing press made possible
onment;" (2) statements imputing "a contagious disease which would exclude a
person from society;" and (3) statements imputing unfitness for, or misconduct
in, a professional capacity. Id. at 398.
Under modem law, there are four classes of slander which are actionable
per se, without proof of special harm: (1) a communication which imputes to
another a criminal offense; (2) a communication which imputes to anoiher a
loathsome disease; (3) a communication which imputes to another a matter in-
compatible with his business, trade, profession, or office; or (4) a communica-
tion which imputes to another serious sexual misconduct. RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND), supra note 3, § 570.
34. Holdsworth, supra note 32, at 401. "Although defamation was still
heard in ecclesiastic courts, the lay courts would entertain not only a slander suit
for general damages if the imputation fit into a per se category, but also suits for
any other slanderous imputations if special damages were shown." 1 A. HAN-
SON, supra note 27, ch. 1, $ 5, at 3. For instance, an accusation of a lady's inconti-
nency would be actionable in the common law court if it could be shown that the
accusation had caused her to lose a marriage which was being arranged. Holds-
worth, supra note 32, at 401.
The requirement of the King's courts that an action for slander which did
not fit into a per se category establish special damages is reflected in the modem
law of slander as well. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 575. A slander-
ous statement that requires proof of special damages is known as slander per
quod. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAw OF DEFAMATION § 23, at 154 (1978). Historically,
pecuniary loss was required to fulfill the "special harm" requirement. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 575 comment b. Modern courts, however, have
"liberalized" the old rule by "find[ing] pecuniary loss when the plaintiff has
been deprived of a benefit which has a more or less indirect financial value to
him," such as the "society, companionship and association of friends." Id. For a
discussion of slander per se, see supra note 33.
35. See Veeder, supra note 19, at 547.
36. See 1 A. HANSON, supra note 27, ch. 1, 5, at 3: For a discussion of
slander per se, see supra note 33. For a discussion of slander per quod, see supra
note 34.
37. R. SMOLLA, supra note 27, § 1.02[1] ("by the seventeenth century the
notorious Court of Star Chamber ... began to punish the offense of political
libel"); Eaton, supra note 21, at 1350 (same).
The Star Chamber was an extremely powerful court which had been created
7
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the wide circulation of printed material, followed by the advent of ac-
tions for libel at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 38 The Star
Chamber had "assumed a strict control over the Press," and concur-
rently assumed jurisdiction over printed matter coming from the
press. 39 The Court of Star Chamber treated printed defamation as a
crime.40 When the defamation concerned a public official, the state-
ment was considered seditious and a threat to the security of the state;
when the statement involved a private person, on the other hand, it was
considered to risk a breach of the peace. 4 1 After the Restoration, which
abolished the Star Chamber, common law courts continued to develop
the concept of libel as a crime. 42 In the latter half of the seventeenth
century, the courts began to treat libel as an independent tort for which
damages were recoverable, 43 even in the absence of proof of special
damages.4 4
to "do substantial justice" where other methods would be ineffective. Veeder,
supra note 19, at 562-63. While the Star Chamber initially punished only polit-
ical statements, its jurisdiction gradually spread to encompass nonpolitical com-
munications. R. SMOLLA, supra note 27, § 1.02[1]; Eaton, supra note 21, at 1350.
38. Veeder, supra note 19, at 562-63. "The new law [of libel] was first set
forth in 1609, in the case De Libelis Famosis .... " Id. at 563. Another authority
maintained, however, that the law of libel originated much earlier:
Before the invention of printing, libels upon private persons must
have been of rare occurrence, though two instances of such libels in the
reign of Edward the Third are mentioned by Coke. In each of these
cases the libeller was criminally punished. The art of printing was in-
troduced into England in 1474, nearly two hundred years after the in-
troduction of the action upon the case.
Book Review, supra note 22, at 604.
39. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 305.
40. Id. The Star Chamber merely adopted a portion of the Roman law of
defamation, "without regard to Roman limitations, and with certain additions
adapted to the purpose in hand." Veeder, supra note 19, at 547. The portion of
the Roman law of defamation that the Star Chamber adopted was the law of
libellusfamosus, which was in sharp contrast to the "comparatively mild law" of
injuria that the ecclesiastical courts had adopted to govern spoken defamation
(slander) a number of years before. See id. at 550-51, 563. For a discussion of
the law of injuria as applied by the ecclesiastic courts to slander actions, see supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
41. Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 305.
42. Id. "The common lawJudges after the Restoration took over the law as
developed by the Star Chamber, and further developed it on similar lines." Id.;
see also Veeder, supra note 19, at 568 ("Although the Star Chamber was abolished
... in 1640, the judges [and] the law ... remained largely the same.").
43. The new civil doctrine of libel was first set forth in King v. Lake, 145
Eng. Rep. 552, 553 (Ex. 1667), in the late seventeenth century. See Veeder, supra
note 19, at 569-70 ("The civil doctrine of libel was first announced.., in King v.
Lake in the Exchequer .... ").
44. The common law courts, starting with King v. Lake, eliminated for the
civil libel actions the requirement found in the law of slander of showing either
that the statement fell under one of the categories of slander per se or that some
form of special damages had been sustained. See Holdsworth, Defamation in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries-Part 3, 41 LAw Q. REV. 13, 16 (1925) (King v.
Lake was first case to distinguish between written and spoken defamation by
8
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At the close of the medieval period in England, therefore, there
were several actions for defamation which required no proof of special
damages-the entire law of libel, and communications which were slan-
derous per se. 45 The law then remained essentially unchanged until the
beginning of the nineteenth century, when the English courts originated
a defense to defamation actions entitled the "fair comment privilege." 4 6
B. The Fair Comment Privilege
The fair comment privilege, which "protected the right of every
person to fairly express opinions on matters of public interest and gen-
eliminating requirement in written defamation of showing special damages). As
the King v. Lake court described the new law: "[A]Ithough such general words
spoken once, without writing or publishing them, would not be actionable; yet
here they being writ and published, which contains more malice, than if they had
but been once spoken, they are actionable." 145 Eng. Rep. at 553.
Under the new law of libel, damages were presumed to have been sustained,
without the necessity of proof, thus eliminating some of the complexities that
had plagued the law of slander. See generally Holdsworth, supra. Holdsworth
pointed out that courts hearing civil libel cases were "emancipat[ed]" because
they could disregard the "unprofitable rules" which had developed in the law of
slander. Id. at 18. In addition to simplifying libel law, eliminating the require-
ment of showing special damages promoted lawsuits, thereby discouraging duel-
ling. Id. at 17; Zimmerman, supra note 27, at 309.
At common law and under the Restatement (Second), libel is actionable even
though no special harm occurred to the plaintiff as a result of the publication.
See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 34, § 23, at 155; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
3, § 569. Although this rule sounds uncomplicated, Professor Eldredge noted
that some courts' treatment of the issue introduced confusion into the law of
libel, which the early English courts had designed to eliminate the complexities
of the law of slander. Professor Eldredge first distinguished between libel which
is defamatory on its face and that which is innocent on its face and requires
extrinsic facts to show its defamatory nature (libel per quod). L. ELDREDGE, supra
note 34, § 23, at 152-56. He gave the following as an example of libel per quod:
"The innocent-on-its-face statement was a birth announcement of twins. The
extrinsic fact that the parents had at the time been married only one month gave
the statement its defamatory sting." Id. at 153 n.4. Professor Eldredge ex-
plained that the confusion arose when some courts mistakenly used the term
"libel per se" (which meant libel actionable in the absence of proof of special
damages, as was all libel) to refer to statements that were defamatory on their
face. This then led other courts
to hold that if the communication was not defamatory on its face [and
required extrinsic facts to show its defamatory nature, thereby making
it libelous per quod], it was not "libel per se," and therefore was not
actionable without proof of special damages. These courts . . . disre-
garded the fact that proof of special damages was never required in libel
cases ....
Id. at 156 (emphasis added). Professor Eldredge concluded that, as of 1965, 12
jurisdictions required proof of special damages in some libel cases, and ex-
pressed his hope that "courts that have adopted the 'libel per quod' rule ... will
reconsider their actions." Id. § 24, at 174, 176.
45. See Veeder, supra note 19, at 571 (summarizing law of defamation as it
existed at end of seventeenth century).
46. For a discussion of the genesis of the fair comment privilege, see infra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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eral concern,"'4 7 is the source of the opinion privilege at issue in
Milkovich.48 The fair comment privilege required courts to distinguish
between statements of fact and those of opinion, foreshadowing the dis-
tinction courts would be called on to make under the opinion
privilege. 49
The privilege of fair comment is qualified, so that the speaker may
lose the protection afforded by the privilege if he acts in bad faith or
otherwise abuses the privilege. 50 While the concept of a general quali-
fied privilege arose in 1597, 5 1 its specific embodiment in the fair com-
47. Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need
for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1819 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Bright-
Line Rule]. Commentators differ as to whether fair comment is a right, a privi-
lege or a defense. See Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair
Comment Defense: An Alternative to "Actual Malice, " 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 2 n.5
(1980) (noting dispute as to whether fair comment is privilege or defense; article
uses various terms and "does not involve itself in this argument"); Note, Bright-
Line Rule, supra, at 1819 n.14 (noting dispute as to "whether fair comment is a
privilege, a right, or a defense"). This Note will refer to fair comment as a privi-
lege, without intending to indicate any theoretically-based preference for this
term. For a discussion of the elements necessary to establish the privilege of fair
comment, see infra note 54 and accompanying text. For general discussions on
the fair comment privilege, see Carman, supra; Titus, Statement of Fact Versus State-
ment of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962);
Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1949).
48. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). The fair comment privilege is the source of the
opinion privilege in that it was the device first employed by courts to "strike the
appropriate balance between the need for vigorous public discourse and the
need to redress injury to citizens wrought by invidious or irresponsible speech."
Id. at 2703. The opinion privilege was later employed to maintain this balance.
See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 380-85, 366
N.E.2d 1299, 1306-09, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950-53 (utilizing opinion privilege
and noting privilege's role in promoting open discussion), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
969 (1977).
49. Under the majority view, courts drew a distinction between fact and
opinion and limited the privilege of fair comment to statements of opinion. The
minority view, on the other hand, extended the privilege to defamatory state-
ments of both opinion and false fact. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 901 (8th ed. 1988); Noel, Defamation of Public
Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 891 (1949); Note, Fact and Opinion
After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 RUTGERS L. REV.
81, 89 (1981). Twenty-six states favored the majority view, while nine states and
most scholars adhered to the minority view. Noel, supra, at 891 & n.83, 896 &
nn. 102-03.
50. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § VI.1, at 267 (1980).
Compare qualified immunity with absolute immunity, which is granted to a
speaker solely on the basis of his position or status and is not defeasible by rea-
son of bad faith. Id.
51. See Vanspike v. Cleyson, 78 Eng. Rep. 788 (Q.B. 1597). In Vanspike, the
defendant made a statement to a third party to whom the plaintiff owed money:
"You had best call for it; take heed how you trust [the plaintiff]." Id. at 788. The
court held that the statement did not constitute libel, but was merely "good
counsel" to the third party. Id. Holdsworth termed Vanspike "the germ of the
idea which will cover most of the cases of qualified privilege in later law."
Holdsworth, supra note 44, at 16.
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ment privilege appears to have originated in the early 1800s in England
for the purpose of promoting discussion on matters of public interest.
5 2
Subsequently, the American courts adopted the privilege as well.
53
The elements necessary to establish the modern version of the fair
comment privilege include: (1) the allegedly defamatory statement must
be one of opinion, and not fact; (2) the opinion must be based on truly
stated facts; (3) the opinion must not be an overly personal attack
against the plaintiff; (4) the opinion must be related to a matter of public
interest; and (5) the opinion must not be stated with malice. 54
52. In order to be actionable, a defamatory statement must be false. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 558; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The common law took the position, nonetheless,
that a defamatory statement of opinion was actionable even though a statement
of opinion is inherently incapable of being either true or false. Milkovich, 110 S.
Ct. at 2702; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 566 comment a; R. SMOLLA,
supra note 27, § 6.02[1]. In order to carve out an area of protected speech
within the broad scope of the law of defamation, courts developed the fair com-
ment privilege. See, e.g.,Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep. 981, 982 (K.B. 1808)
("Liberty of criticism must be allowed .... Fair discussion is essentially neces-
sary to the truth of history, and the advancement of science."); see also Milkovich,
110 S. Ct. at 2703 ("[D]ue to concerns that unduly burdensome defamation laws
could stifle valuable public debate, the privilege of 'fair comment' was incorpo-
rated into the common law as an affirmative defense to an action for defama-
tion."); Trager & Chamberlin, The Dangerous Exception to Protection for Opinion,
COMM. & L., Dec. 1989, at 51, 53 ("[T]o prevent self-censorship based on fear of
being sued for libel or slander, the courts granted certain protections ...
[These protections included] a qualified immunity from defamation actions to
allow the expression of opinions regarding subjects of public interest."); Note,
Bright-Line Rule, supra note 47, at 1819 ("[C]ourts believed the social value of
freely distributed comment outweighed the potential harm to the individual
criticized.").
53. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285 (1908)
(recognizing privilege to speak on "matters of public concern, public men, and
candidates for office;" privilege qualified in that plaintiff may recover upon a
showing of malice); Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 238-39 (1877) (recognizing
newspaper's right to publish "fair and reasonable comments, however severe in
terms, upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition,
as upon any other matter of public interest;" publication privileged unless mal-
ice is proved); Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 359, 83 N.W. 110, 112-13
(1900) (recognizing a right to state opinions on character or conduct of candi-
date for public office, so long as opinions stem from "honest belief" and are not
stated as facts); Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 154, 71
N.E. 739, 742 (1904) (recognizing "a right to comment on matters of public
interest, so long as one does so fairly, with an honest purpose, and not intem-
perately and maliciously").
54. Carman, supra note 47, at 11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 566 (1977) and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-610 (1938)); see also Note,
Bright-Line Rule, supra note 47, at 1819 n.20.
Only the majority view requires that the statement be one of opinion in
order to be protected under the fair comment privilege. Likewise, the require-
ment of truly stated facts would only be applicable to the majority view, since
under the minority view, opinions, false statements of fact and presumably opin-
ions based on such false statements of fact are protected. For a discussion of the
majority and minority views on fair comment, see supra note 49.
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While the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 55 appar-
ently recognized the fair comment privilege, 56 nonetheless, some com-
mentators viewed the Court's later dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 57
as having supplanted fair comment by establishing an opinion privi-
lege.58 Other commentators, however, viewed fair comment as remain-
ing viable after Gertz.59 It remains to be seen whether the Court's
eradication of the opinion privilege in Milkovich will breathe new life into
the fair comment privilege.60 After Milkovich, which has abolished the
Some commentators make no mention of the requirement that the state-
ment not constitute an overly personal attack. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52,
§ 606; Note, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Statements of Fact]; Note, The
Fact-Opinion Determination in Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 (1988).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Id. at 292 n.30. As the Court stated:
Insofar as the proposition means only that the statements about
police conduct libeled respondent by implicitly criticizing his ability to
run the Police Department, recovery is also precluded in this case by
the doctrine of fair comment. Since the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstate-
ments of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be afforded
for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true,
statements of facts. Both defenses are of course defeasible if the public
official proves actual malice, as was not done here.
Id. (citation omitted).
57. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz Court, in dictum, explained: "Under
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Id. at 339-40.
58. Prosser and Keeton opined that if all opinions were to be deemed non-
actionable, then there would no longer be any purpose for the fair comment
privilege and it would thus be eliminated "in favor of a much broader absolute
privilege." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, § 113A, at 815. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts even went so far as to omit Title B of Chapter 25, the title that
had previously discussed fair comment. In the words of the American Law Insti-
tute: "A statement of opinion that does not imply a defamatory statement of fact
is no longer actionable, and no privilege is needed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 3, §§ 606-610 note on status of title.
59. "Reports of the demise of the fair comment privilege may, like the pre-
mature reports of the death of Mark Twain, be greatly exaggerated." R.
SMOLLA, supra note 27, § 6.02[41[b]. One commentator has suggested that the
fair comment privilege may provide a vehicle that would enable courts to avoid
restricting freedom of speech in the face of '"a constricted category of public
figures." Carman, supra note 47, at 2-3; see also Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's
Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 875
n. 192 (1984) (discussing various ways in which fair comment privilege "may re-
tain a continuing role").
60. Professor Smolla, prior to Milkovich, suggested two reasons why the fair
comment privilege may remain viable as an alternative to the opinion privilege.
R. SMOLLA, supra note 27, § 6.02[4][b]. First, since courts are generally predis-
posed to avoid deciding cases on constitutional grounds where possible, Smolla
opined that they may prefer to decide cases using the state law basis of fair com-
ment rather than on the constitutional basis of the opinion privilege. Id. Sec-
ond, Smolla theorized that "courts may feel bolder in experimenting with more
658 [Vol. 36: p. 647
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss2/5
opinion privilege and substituted pre-existing constitutional principles
in its place, lower courts may feel more comfortable using non-constitu-
tional grounds like the fair comment privilege to decide cases rather
than the constitutional doctrine on which they have not placed sole reli-
ance in the past. Alternatively, if the lower courts perceive that the con-
stitutional doctrine set forth in Milkovich will not protect a statement of
opinion to the same extent as would the fair comment privilege in a
given case, they may wish to employ the fair comment privilege in order
to provide maximum protection for the statement. Unfortunately, the
full effect of Milkovich, the latest decision in a series of Supreme Court
opinions constitutionalizing defamation, is still undetermined.
C. The Constitutionalization of Defamation
The law of defamation was first subjected to constitutional guide-
lines in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.6 1 The United States Supreme
Court Justices agreed that an Alabama rule of law allowing a public offi-
cial to recover for libel in the absence of legal injury, malice or proof of
general damages was "constitutionally deficient for failure to provide
the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a
public official against critics of his official conduct. '" 62 The Court held
that, in order to recover, the public official had to prove that the defend-
ant had acted with actual malice.63 Actual malice, said the Court, would
expansive protection for opinion on a common law basis than as a matter of
constitutional law." Id.
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times had published a full page
advertisement which stated that blacks in the South were "being met by an un-
precedented wave of terror" in their effort to uphold the guarantees of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights. Id. at 256. The ad described certain events
constituting this wave of terror. Id. at 257. Respondent, who supervised the
Police Department of the city of Montgomery, Alabama, contended that certain
references to the police and police activities concerned him and were false. Id.
at 257-59. He sued for libel. Id. at 256. The trial court instructed the jury that
since the statements were "libelous per se" and no privilege attached, the jury
need only find that the statements were "of and concerning" the respondent in
order to find the New York Times Company liable. Id. at 262. The trial judge
instructed the jury that legal injury, falsity, malice and general damages were
presumed, although the jury would need to find actual malice in order to award
punitive damages. Id. The trial judge's sole instruction concerning actual mal-
ice was that "mere negligence or carelessness" was not enough. Id. The jury
awarded respondent $500,000 in damages. Id. at 256. On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court "sustained the trial judge's rulings and instructions in all re-
spects." Id. at 263. For a general discussion of New York Times, see Epstein, Was
New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986).
62. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264.
63. Id. at 279-80. The Alabama Supreme Court had held that the Times'
"irresponsibility" was sufficient to constitute malice. Id. at 263.
The concept of "actual malice" as used by the Supreme Court differs from
common law malice, which is "roughly equivalent to ill will." Smolla, Let the
Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
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be present when the defendant had acted "with knowledge that [the
statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.'"64
A few years thereafter, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts65 extended the
New York Times requirement of malice to defamation actions involving
public figures. 66 Five Justices agreed that if the New York Times standard
48 (1983). The Court later clarified the distinction when it stated that "ill will
toward the plaintiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the New York Times [ac-
tual malice] standard." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18
(1971).
64. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. In arriving at the actual malice stan-
dard, Justice Brennan, delivering the Court's opinion, first determined that the
availability of the defense of truth was inadequate to preserve the free exchange
of speech. Id. at 279. He noted that the potentially heavy burden of proving the
defense of truth was on the defendant. Id. This would dissuade "would-be crit-
ics of official conduct" from such criticism, even though known to be true, be-
cause of a fear that they would be unable to prove their speech was truthful and
thus would be liable for defamation. Id. The critics would then only make state-
ments they could easily prove true, and statements in the less provable zone
would not be disseminated to the general population. Id. Thus, according to
justice Brennan, the truth defense did nothing towards assuaging the dampen-
ing effect of the Alabama defamation law on criticism of public conduct. Id.
Noting that a number of state courts had adopted a similar rule, Justice Brennan
then set forth the Court's holding regarding actual malice-in the absence of
actual malice, statements regarding public officials are protected, even where the
statements involve false defamatory assertions of fact. Id. at 279-83.
Finally, Justice Brennan analogized the standard set forth for criticism of a
public official to the qualified privilege that an official himself enjoys on official
matters. Id. at 282. Justice Brennan determined that failure to grant the general
public a privilege similar to that available to the official would "give public ser-
vants an unjustified preference over the public they serve." Id. at 282-83.
Justices Black and Goldberg each authored a concurring opinion in which
Justice Douglas joined. These three Justices would have gone even further than
the majority in protecting criticism of official conduct by declaring such criticism
to be unconditionally protected. See id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) (Constitu-
tion completely proscribes recovery by public officials in defamation actions,
rather than merely delimiting states' authority to allow such recovery); id. at 298
(Goldberg, J., concurring in the result) (Constitution gives an "absolute, uncon-
ditional privilege to criticize official conduct").
65. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Butts, the petitioner published an article in the
Saturday Evening Post which accused respondent, the athletic director and a for-
mer coach for the University of Georgia, of trying to fix a football game. Id. at
135-36. The trial court awarded Butts $460,000 in damages on his libel claim.
Id. at 138. Petitioner moved for a new trial on the theory that New York Times,
which the United States Supreme Court had recently decided, required a finding
of actual malice in order for Butts to recover damages. Id. The trial court de-
nied the motion on the basis that the New York Times requirement of actual mal-
ice applied only to public officials, which Butts clearly was not, and furthermore,
that the jury could have found that petitioner had in fact acted with actual mal-
ice. Id. at 138-39. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed on the ground that, since petitioner was chargeable with knowledge of
the proceedings in New York Times and nonetheless failed to advance a constitu-
tional claim, it had waived its right to make the claim. Id. at 139.
66. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). Justice Harlan, writ-
ing for the majority, found that Butts constituted a public figure because he
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were "[e]venly applied to [defamation] cases involving 'public men'-
whether they be 'public officials' or 'public figures'-it [would] afford
the necessary insulation for the fundamental interests which the First
Amendment was designed to protect."
67
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.68 appeared to further extend first
amendment protection by applying the New York Times malice standard
to all actions by a private individual against a media concern when the
individual had been involved in "an event of public or general con-
cern." 69 The Court seemed to retreat from the broad protection of Ro-
senbloom, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 70 In Gertz, the Court held
"commanded a substantial amount of public interest" due to his "position
alone." Id. at 154-55. The opinion of the Court stated that the appropriate
standard to be applied to public figures was "a showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
Three other justices joined injustice Harlan's opinion. Id. at 133. A total of five
Justices, however, instead endorsed ChiefJustice Warren's concurring opinion
that the New York Times standard of malice should be adhered to in cases involv-
ing public figures, as well as cases involving public officials. See id. at 164 (War-
ren, C.J., concurring in the result); id. at 170 (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting) (justice Douglas joined injustice Black's opinion); id. at 172 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring and dissenting) (justice White joined in justice Brennan's
opinion). Thus, a majority of the justices adopted the New York Times standard.
67. Id. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
68. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Respondent's radio station, WIP, had broadcast
several news stories relating to petitioner's arrest for possession of obscene
literature and his subsequent lawsuit for injunctive relief from publicity and po-
lice interference. Id. at 33-35. The broadcasts variously referred to "[s]mut
[m]erchants," "obscene books" (instead of allegedly obscene), "girlie-book ped-
dlers" and "smut literature racket." Id. at 33-34. After a jury acquitted peti-
tioner on the criminal obscenity charges, he sued respondent for libel under
Pennsylvania law. Id. at 36. The trial judge instructed the jury that in order to
find for petitioner they would need to find that WIP either "intended to injure
the plaintiff personally or ... exercised the privilege [of reporting] unreasonably
and without reasonable care." Id. at 39. The jury awarded petitioner $25,000 in
general damages and $725,000 in punitive damages, but the trial court reduced
the punitive damages award to $250,000. Id. at 40. On appeal, the Third Cir-
cuit held the New York Times standard to be applicable on this matter of public
concern involving a private plaintiff, and found that the standard had not been
met. Id.
69. Id. at 52. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the
required New York Times standard of malice had not been met. Id. at 55-56.
70. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Petitioner Gertz, an attorney, was representing
the family of a boy who had been shot by Nuccio (a policeman) in a civil suit
against Nuccio. Id. at 325. Nuccio was concurrently on trial for the homicide.
Id. Respondent's magazine published an article entitled FRAME-UP: Richard
Nuccio And The War On Police which, inter alia, falsely labeled Gertz a "Leninist"
and a "Communist-fronter." Id. at 325-26. Petitioner brought a libel action in
the district court, and the court essentially ruled that since petitioner was neither
a public official nor a public figure, the New York Times standard was inapplicable.
Id. at 328. The court discounted respondent's argument that the New York Times
standard was applicable due solely to the presence of a public issue, and submit-
ted the case to the jury under a theory of libel per se in which the sole issue for
the jury was that of damages. Id. at 328-29. The jury awarded petitioner
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that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private indi-
vidual."17 1 Nevertheless, the Court retained the requirement that the
New York Times standard of actual malice be met for recovery of punitive
damages.72
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 73 was the next major
$50,000. Id. at 329. The district court then changed its position. Anticipating
the impending Rosenbloom decision, it granted judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the basis that the presence of a public issue mandated the imposition
of the New York Times standard, which it found not to have been met. Id. at 329-
30. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of the
Rosenbloom decision, which by that time had been handed down by the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 330-32. For general discussions of Gertz, see
Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 645 (1977); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment. In Praise of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1976).
71. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. In arriving at the majority's conclusion, Justice
Powell first discussed the tension inherent in balancing "the need for a vigorous
and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury."
Id. at 342. He then noted that while, as a theoretical matter, the balancing
should be performed on a case by case basis, as a practical matter, such an "ad
hoc" approach would be unworkable and general rules were needed. Id. at 343-
44. Justice Powell concluded that while the New York Times malice standard de-
termined the protection afforded to speech regarding public officials and public
persons, the same standard should not be applied to private individuals because
"private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery" because they have
not chosen to subject themselves to public scrutiny as have most public officials
and public figures. Id. at 342-45. The standard that the Court articulated for
private individuals "recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields
the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation."
Id. at 348.
Although the Court did not expressly limit its decision to media defendants
(the factual situation in Gertz), some lower courts refused to extend the holding
in Gertz to nonmedia defendants. For a discussion of the lower court split on the
applicability of Gertz to nonmedia defendants, see infra note 153.
72. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. In concluding that where a plaintiff does not
establish the New York Times standard of actual malice he is limited to recovering
damages for actual injury suffered, Justice Powell reasoned that "the States have
no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous
awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury." Id. Therefore,
Justice Powell determined that "state remedies for defamatory falsehood
[should) reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest in-
volved." Id.
Gertz also set forth the famous dictum which gave rise to the opinion privi-
lege. For the text of this dictum and a discussion of how it produced the opinion
privilege, see infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
73. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). The suit stemmed from a negative review of peti-
tioner's loudspeaker system which was published in respondent's magazine, stat-
ing that "individual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow
to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room." Id. at 488. Peti-
tioner filed a product disparagement action in the district court, which held that
petitioner was a public figure under Gertz and that the requisite malice standard
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defamation case decided by the Supreme Court. In its holding, the
Court established that the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate re-
view prescribed by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
inapplicable to a finding of actual malice under New York Times.74
Rather, an appellate court must "exercise independent judgment and
determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing
clarity." 7
5
Whereas the Court's major defamation decisions prior to 1985 had
involved either public persons or matters of public concern, in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 76 the Court was called on to con-
of New York Times had been met. Id. at 489-91. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed due to its finding that the evi-
dence fell short of establishing the New York Times standard. Id. at 492. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide whether the court of ap-
peals was correct in conducting an independent review of "the record to ensure
that the district court ha[d] applied properly the governing constitutional law
and that the plaintiff ha[d] indeed satisfied its burden of proof," or whether it
should instead have applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 492-93 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1982)).
74. Id. at 514. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first reiterated the
principle that the independent review of the record called for in determining the
presence of actual malice is not proscribed by Rule 52(a). Id. at 499. Further-
more, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the rule "does not inhibit an appellate
court's power to correct errors of law, including ... mixed findings of law and
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the gov-
erning rule of law." Id. at 501. With these principles established, Justice Ste-
vens set forth three important characteristics of the New York Times malice
requirement: first, the requirement of actual malice originated at common law
where the judge played a large role in determining the existence of malice; sec-
ond, the concept of malice is an evolutionary and largely judge-made concept;
and third, due to the importance of malice as a constitutional protection, it is
"imperative" that the concept be properly applied. Id. at 501-02.
75. Id. at 514. After an in-depth examination of the characteristics of the
New York Times standard of actual malice and a review of other first amendment
cases in which appellate courts conducted independent review, Justice Stevens
concluded that independent review of findings of New York Times actual malice
was appropriate as well. Id. at 502-11.
76. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Petitioner had provided five of its subscribers
with a credit report on respondent indicating that respondent had filed for bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 751. In actuality, it was one of respondent's former employees
who had filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 752. A 17-year-old employee of petitioner
had erred in his report, and petitioner had not checked the accuracy of the re-
port prior to distributing it to subscribers. Id. Respondent brought a defama-
tion action in Vermont state court, and the jury awarded respondent both
presumed damages, which are those awarded in the absence of proof of actual
injury, and punitive damages. Id. at 752, 760-61. Petitioner moved for a new
trial on the grounds that Gertz required a finding of actual malice as a precondi-
tion to the award of punitive or presumed damages. Id. at 752. The trial court
granted the motion, and the Vermont Supreme Court reversed on the basis that
nonmedia speakers "are not 'the type of media worthy of First Amendment pro-
tection as contemplated by New York Times and its progeny.' " Id. at 753 (quoting
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 73-74, 461 A.2d
414, 417-18 (1983)) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed, "although
17
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sider a case which involved a private figure plaintiff, a private figure de-
fendant and a matter not of public concern. The issue before the Court
was whether a showing of actual malice was necessary to recover pre-
sumed and punitive damages in a case not involving a matter of public
concern. 7 7 The Court, after balancing "the State's interest in compen-
sating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First
Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression," held that
allowing such recovery in the absence of malice was not violative of the
first amendment. 78
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,7 9 the Court returned to con-
sideration of the scope of defamation law on a matter of public con-
cern.80 Although the Court in Dun & Bradstreet had refused to impose
first amendment protections on speech not involving a public person or
a public issue, Hepps extended the protection which Gertz had already
afforded to speech concerning private plaintiffs on matters of public
concern. 81 While at common law defamatory statements were presump-
tively false, Hepps abolished this presumption in cases involving a media
for reasons different from those relied on by the Vermont Supreme Court." Id.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's rationale and holding in Dun & Brad-
street, see infra note 78 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of Dun
& Bradstreet, see Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New
Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. LJ. 1519, 1535-45
(1987).
77. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751.
78. Id. at 757, 763. The analysis which Justice Powell employed in arriving
at the holding in Dun & Bradstreet was the same as that which he employed in
Gertz-a balancing of the state's interest in protecting and compensating injuries
to reputation against first amendment protections for freedom of speech. Id. at
757. Justice Powell found the strength of the state's interest in protecting repu-
tation to be precisely the same as it was in Gertz. Id. The first amendment inter-
est at issue in this case, protecting speech on matters of private concern,
however, was significantly less than the constitutional interest in Gertz, protect-
ing speech on matters of public concern. Id. at 758. While in Gertz the first
amendment interest had outweighed the state's interest in awarding presumed
and punitive damages without a showing of malice, in this case the first amend-
ment interest was not strong enough to overcome the state's interest in award-
ing such damages. Id. at 760-61.
79. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). In Hepps, appellees sued appellant, Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., for defamation based on a series of articles in the Philadelphia
Inquirer implying that appellees had "links to organized crime and used some of
those links to influence ... governmental processes." Id. at 769. Under Penn-
sylvania law, defamatory statements were presumptively false. Id. at 770. The
trial court, however, ruled that this traditional presumption violated the United
States Constitution and therefore instructed the jury that plaintiff had the bur-
den of proving falsity. Id. The jury found for Philadelphia Newspapers, and
appellees appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 771. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Gertz as "simply requiring the plaintiff
to show fault in actions for defamation," rather than requiring "a showing of
falsity." Id. (emphasis added). For a general discussion of Hepps, see Smolla,
supra note 76, at 1525-31.
80. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768-69.
81. Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, limited the holding in
18
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defendant and matters of public concern.82 The Court stated: "[W]e
believe that a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing
that the speech at issue is false before recovering damages for defama-
tion from a media defendant. To do otherwise could 'only result in a
deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.' "83
The Court's major decisions constitutionalizing defamation may be
summarized as follows. A finding of actual malice is necessary in order
for a statement concerning a public official or public figure to be action-
able. 84 A finding of malice is also necessary for a private figure to re-
cover punitive damages on a matter of public concern, at least where a
media defendant is involved. For a private figure to recover only gen-
eral damages, however, at least where there is a matter of public con-
cern, the states may set their own standard of fault as long as some fault is
required.8 5 Also applicable to a private plaintiff on a matter of public
concern is Hepps' requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of prov-
ing falsity, at least in cases involving media defendants. 86 Finally, all
findings of actual malice are subject to independent appellate review. 8 7
While the lower courts recognized these holdings, they also recog-
nized a principle not contained explicitly in any holding of the Supreme
Court-that, pursuant to dictum in Gertz, statements of opinion were en-
Hepps to cases where "a newspaper publishes speech of public concern" and
subsequently a "private-figure plaintiff" is attempting to recover damages. Id.
82. Id. at 776-77. The Hepps Court explicitly reserved judgment on whether
private plaintiffs on matters of public concern must similarly prove falsity against
nonmedia defendants. Id. at 779 n.4. Accordingly, lower courts have split on
this issue. For a discussion of the lower court split, see infra note 153.
83. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526(1958)). Justice O'Connor's analysis in the majority opinion began with the
proposition that in cases where it is impossible to prove whether the speech at
issue is true or false, the burden of proof will be dispositive. Id. at 776. No
matter whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the burden of proving, respec-
tively, falsity or truth, some cases would result in which the outcome would be
"at variance with the outcome that we would desire if all speech were either
demonstrably true or demonstrably false." Id. Since placing the burden of
proving truth on the defendant would have a "chilling" effect on free speech,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the burden of proving falsity should instead be
placed on the private-figure plaintiff in cases involving a media defendant on a
matter of public concern. Id. at 776-77.
84. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figure); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official). For a discus-
sion of Butts, see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
New York Times, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
85. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see also Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). For a discussion
of Gertz, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Dun &
Bradstreet, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
86. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). For a
discussion of Hepps, see supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
87. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984). For a discussion of Bose, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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titled to their own constitutional privilege. 88 The lower courts then set
out to define the scope and nature of this privilege.
D. Development of the Opinion Privilege
Traditionally, statements of opinion regarding matters of public in-
terest had been protected by the fair comment privilege.8 9 Following
the Gertz decision, many state courts and lower federal courts deter-
mined that the first amendment mandated a blanket privilege for all
opinions, even those unprotected under the traditional fair comment
privilege by reason of their being outside the realm of public interest.90
The courts based their determinations that the Supreme Court had
mandated an opinion privilege on three cases: Gertz, 9 1 Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin 92 and Green-
belt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler.9 3 Bresler held that a
word used as "no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet"
was not actionable, 9 4 while the Court held in Letter Carriers that words
88. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.)
("[o]pinion is absolutely protected under the First Amendment" (citing Gertz,
418 U.S. at 339)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Lauderback v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 741 F.2d 193, 195 (8th Cir. 1984) ("right of free speech pro-
vides absolute protection to statements which are purely opinions" (citing Gertz,
418 U.S. at 339-40)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985); Mashburn v. Collin, 355
So. 2d 879, 884 (La. 1977) (Gertz "strongly indicated.., that mere comment or
opinion on public matters, even though defamatory, enjoys the unqualified pro-
tection of the First Amendment"); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 369, 380, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950 ("[olpinions
... are constitutionally protected and may not be the subject of private damage
actions"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Braig v. Field Communications, 310
Pa. Super. 569, 580-81, 456 A.2d 1366, 1372-73 (1983) (adopting RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) Or TORTS § 566 comment c (1977) and "recogniz[ing] that [a] 'pure'
expression of opinion is absolutely privileged as a result of Gertz"), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 970 (1984).
89. For a discussion of the fair comment privilege and the elements thereof,
see supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion of the viability of the fair comment privilege, see supra
notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of Gertz, see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
92. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
93. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
94. Id. at 14. The petitioner had printed two articles which stated that re-
spondent's negotiations with the city had been characterized by some people as
"blackmail." Id. at 7. Respondent contended that the use of the word "black-
mail" imputed that crime to him, and since he had not committed such an of-
fense, the statements were false and therefore libelous. Id. at 13. The Court
held that because any reader would conclude that the word "blackmail" was be-
ing used as hyperbole and not as an imputation of a criminal offense, the state-
ment was protected under the Constitution. Id. at 14-15. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines hyperbole as "[a] figure of speech consisting in exaggerated or
extravagant statement, used to express strong feeling or produce a strong im-
pression, and not intended to be understood literally." 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989).
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used "in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate . ... strong disagree-
ment with the views [of another]" were similarly inactionable. 9 5
In Gertz, the Court had commented in dictum that "[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."'96
The lower courts read Gertz in conjunction with the holdings in Bresler
and Letter Carriers and concluded that they must recognize a privilege for
statements of opinion.9 7
Accordingly, the lower courts developed a variety of tests to deter-
mine whether a statement was one of fact, and therefore potentially ac-
tionable, or one of opinion for which no action would lie. Three
primary categories of tests emerged: The Restatement (Second) of Torts
test, 98 the verifiability test, 99 and various multi-factor tests.10 0
1. The Restatement (Second) Test
Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "A defamatory
communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion,
but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allega-
tion of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion."' 0 '
95. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284. The action in Letter Carriers was based on
newsletter articles in which respondents' names appeared in a "List of Scabs"
and a subsequent article which purported to define a "scab," because they had
not joined the union. Id. at 267-68. The definition referred to the scabs' "rotten
principles," lack of character, and tendency to be traitors. Id. at 268. The Court
reasoned that since the language was used in a "loose, figurative sense," a
reader could not reasonably believe that the article was charging the non-union
members with, for example, actually committing the crime of treason. Id. at
284-85. Therefore, because the language was "merely rhetorical hyperbole, a
lusty and imaginative expression of... contempt," it was a form of opinion and
protected under the labor laws. Id. at 286.
96. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. The Court later quoted this dictum with ap-
proval in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting for
proposition that there is "no such thing as a 'false' idea"), Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (quoting full dic-
tum) and Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284 (same).
97. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (collecting federal cases recognizing Gertz dictum as controlling law), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). For a further discussion of the recognition of a
privilege for opinions, see infra notes 101-24 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the Restatement (Second) test, see infra notes 101-08
and accompanying text.
99. For a discussion of the verifiability test, see infra notes 109-15 and ac-
companying text.
100. For a discussion of the multi-factor tests, see infra notes 116-24 and
accompanying text.
101. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 3, § 566. For discussions, analyses
and criticisms of the methodology and results of the Restatement (Second) test, see
Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MIcH. L.
REV. 1621 (1977) (focusing on whether statements of opinion, including ridi-
cule, are actionable); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
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Comment b elaborates on this concept by dividing opinions into two
types, pure and mixed.' 0 2 Pure opinions are those in which the speaker
either (1) states the facts upon which the opinion is based, or (2) does
not state such facts, but their existence is known to him and to his audi-
ence and the existence of additional facts is not implied. t0 3 A mixed
opinion, on the other hand, is one in which "the comment is reasonably
understood as implying the assertion of the existence of undisclosed
facts about the plaintiff that must be defamatory in character in order to
justify the opinion."' 0 4 According to the Restatement (Second), pure opin-
ions are not actionable, while an action may lie for mixed opinions. 10 5
The Restatement (Second) bases its protection for pure statements of opin-
ion on the Gertz dictum,' 0 6 and sets forth two possible bases for its con-
clusion that mixed statements of opinion may be actionable. The first
possible basis is that, with a mixed opinion, there has been a publication
of the defamatory facts whose existence was implied. A second basis for
the Restatement (Second) 's conclusion is simply a black letter rule that "an
expression of a mixed opinion can itself be a defamatory communica-
tion." 10 7 The concept set forth by the Restatement (Second) was the
method most widely used by the courts prior to Milhovich for determin-
ing when a statement was actionable.' 0 8
COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1239-45 (1976) (criticizing treatment of opinions under
Restatement (Second) for resting on slight foundation of Gertz, being unnecessarily
disruptive, and failing to eliminate liability for unreasonable opinions).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 566 comment b.
103. Id. The Restatement (Second) gives the following illustration of a state-
ment of pure opinion:
A writes to B about his neighbor C: "He moved in six months ago. He
works downtown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in
his backyard about 5:30 seated in a deck chair with a portable radio
listening to a news broadcast, and with a drink in his hand. I think he
must be an alcoholic."
Id. comment c, illustration 4. The Restatement (Second) explains that "[tihe state-
ment indicates the facts on which the expression of opinion was based and does
not imply others. These facts are not defamatory and A is not liable for defama-
tion." Id.
104. Id. comment c. The Restatement (Second) gives the following as an ex-
ample of a mixed opinion: "A writes to B about his neighbor C: 'I think he must
be an alcoholic.' " Id. illustration 3. The Restatement (Second) indicates that this
statement could be found to imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts
on which the statement is based. Id.
105. Id. comment c.
106. Id. The Restatement (Second) notes that while prior to Gertz statements
of pure opinion had been actionable, such actions were rendered unconstitu-
tional by Gertz. Id.
107. Id.
108. Note, Statements of Fact, supra note 54, at 1012 ("The Second Restatement
view ... is the predominant view in the lower courts .. "); see also id at 1012
n.70 (collecting cases utilizing the Restatement (Second) analysis). Contra Brief for
Respondent at LEXIS *26, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695
(1990) (No. 89-645) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) ("most courts have not
668 [Vol. 36: p. 647
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2. The Verifiability Test
Other courts which did not adopt the Restatement (Second) instead
devised a test based on the verifiability of the defamatory statement.
Under this test, if a statement is verifiable, it is factual and thus actiona-
ble.' 0 9 If the statement is not capable of being verified, then it is not
actionable."Il 0 The formulations of this test vary. In Buckley v. Littell, I I
the court found that the term "fascist" was imprecise and the "content is
so debatable ... that [it is] insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity" and
thus not actionable. " 2 The court in Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche' 3 stated
simply: "An assertion that cannot be proved false cannot be held libel-
lous. 11 4 The verifiability test, while sometimes used alone, was also
used as one prong of the various multi-factor tests adopted by several
courts., 15
limited themselves to the mechanical and often artificial methodology of the Sec-
ond Restatement").
109. Note, Statements of Fact, supra note 54, at 1017-18.
110. Id.
111. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). The
basis for the action was a book written by Littell that labeled Buckley a "fellow
traveler of fascism." Id. at 890.
112. Id. at 894. The court determined that the terms "fascist" and "fellow
traveler" were so imprecise that the court was forced to speculate on the mean-
ing of the statements. Id. at 892-93. The moment that it had to engage in such
speculation, the court considered itself "in the area of opinion as opposed to
factual assertion" and the statements were thus protected as ones of opinion. Id.
at 892.
113. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.-834 (1977). The court
summarized the allegedly defamatory statements, contained in a book that Cas-
tillo-Puche wrote, as follows:
Castillo-Puche describes Hotchner as a manipulator, a "toady," a
"hypocrite" who exhibited "two-faced behavior" toward Hemingway's
true friends and "put up a very good front as [Hemingway's] mild-man-
nered, obedient servant," an "exploiter of [Hemingway's] reputation"
who was "never open and above board." The sixth passage is one in
which Hemingway, referring to Hotchner, tells Castillo-Puche: "I don't
really trust him, though."
Id. at 912.
114. Id. at 913. The court determined that Castillo-Puche's characteriza-
tions of Hotchner, "viewed in isolation," were statements of opinion protected
under Gertz because they could not be proven false. Id. Curiously, the court
went on to apply an apparent variation of the Restatement (Second) test. It stated
that "[i]f an author represents that he has private, first-hand knowledge which
substantiates the opinions he expresses," then statements of opinion may be
actionable if the defendant knew the underlying facts were false or probably
false. Id. In this case, the court found that the defendant (the publisher) had no
reason to believe that any underlying facts were false, as it believed Castillo-
Puche had based his opinions on personal observations. Id. at 913-14. Hence,
the publisher was not liable for defamation. Id. at 914.
115. For an example showing the use of the verifiability test as one part of a
multi-factor test, see infra notes 119, 123 and accompanying text.
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3. Multi-Factor Tests
Different courts devised different multi-factor tests to use in deter-
mining whether a statement was one of fact or one of opinion.' 1 6 The
primary multi-factor test was that formulated by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Oilman v. Evans.' i7 In that case,
the defendants wrote a column in which they labeled Ollman as being,
among other things, "widely viewed in his profession [political science
professor] as a political activist" and "an outspoken proponent of 'polit-
ical Marxism.' " '118 On appeal, the circuit court held that courts should
evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding a defamatory
statement, and established four factors which courts should examine in
performing such an evaluation: (1) the common usage or meaning of
the language used in the statement, including the presence of a precise
core of meaning; (2) the verifiability of the statement; (3) the full context
of the statement and the use of cautionary language; and (4) the broader
context or setting in which the statement appears. 1 19
The Oilman court first examined the broad context in which the spe-
cific statements appeared (on the op-ed page of a newspaper) and con-
cluded that readers expect a column on that page merely to express the
writer's opinion. 120 The court then examined the context of the article
116. See Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d
1280 (4th Cir. 1987) (establishing two-step test, with second step containing
three factors, based on Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d
1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (establishing four-part test based on plurality opinion
and concurring opinion in Oilman), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Information
Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980)
(establishing three-part test); Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462
(1982) (establishing three-part test).
117. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985). The following discussion of Oilman is intended to illustrate the applica-
tion of only one of the many multi-factor tests that the courts utilized in deter-
mining whether a statement was one of fact or opinion.
For general discussions of the Oilman decision and the court's methodology,
see R. SMOLLA, supra note 27, § 6.08[3]-[4] (performing a "case study" of
Oilman); Heidig, Ollman v. Evans: Skinning the Membrane of Fact Versus Opinion, 23
TORT & INS. L.J. 232 (1987) (in-depth analysis of the majority and dissenting
opinions); Note, Bright-Line Rule, supra note 47, at 1839-45 (performing a case
study).
118. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 972 (emphasis omitted). The defendants further
contended that Ollman's "candid writings avow his desire to use the classroom
as an instrument for preparing what he calls 'the revolution.' " Id. (emphasis
omitted). The article also quoted a political scientist who called Ollman a "pure
and simple activist" with "no status within the profession." Id. at 973 (emphasis
omitted).
119. Id. at 979.
120. Id. at 986-87. The basis for the court's conclusion was that readers
were aware that the defendants' columns on the op-ed page were not " 'hard'
news" and may have contained statements "that would hardly be considered
balanced or fair elsewhere in the newspaper." Id. at 986 (citing National Rifle
Ass'n v. Dayton Newspaper, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299, 1309 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
24
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itself, and characterized it as designed only to raise certain questions
regarding Oilman and "not purporting to set forth definitive crite-
ria." 1 2 1 These factors pointed to the article as being a statement of
opinion, although the court did not expressly so state. The court then
turned to an analysis of the specific statements at issue, and concluded
that all of the statements were protected as opinion. 122 In its analysis,
the court found several considerations which supported a finding of
opinion-specifically, the lack of precise definitions for the labels that
the authors had applied to Oilman, and the extent to which the authors
had revealed the facts on which they based their opinion. 123 Given
these factors, the court found that the defendants were not liable for
their statements. Other courts apparently agreed with this analysis, as
the Oilman test was widely accepted.' 24
Accordingly, until very recently, courts used a test from one of the
three categories detailed above to determine whether a statement was
an actionable one of fact, or a nonactionable one of opinion. Although
121. Id. at 987. Furthermore, the article stated its purpose as being to
"spark a... debate" concerning Oilman and contained a section which literally
posed questions raised by Ollman's appointment. According to the court, this
constituted cautionary language. Id.
122. Id. at 987-92.
123. Id. The court first found the term "political Marxism" to be "loosely
definable [and] variously interpretable," as well as unverifiable, and thus to be
opinion. Id. at 987 (citing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 895 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977)). The court next looked at the statement labeling
Ollman a "political activist," and found that term to be "imprecise" as well. Id.
The court noted the impossibility of defining how much political activity quali-
fies a person as an "activist." Id. The court also factored into its analysis the
defendants' inclusion in the article of the facts on which the label "political ac-
tivist" was based, finding this inclusion to support the conclusion that the state-
ment was one of opinion. Id. at 987-88.
The court then analyzed the defendants' statement regarding Ollman's de-
sire to use the classroom to prepare for the "revolution," and found it to be
opinion. Id. at 988-89. The court found that the context of the statement, which
followed a discussion of Oilman's writings, made it clear that the defendants
were expressing their interpretation of those writings. Id. at 989. Additionally,
the statement was not clearly definable or susceptible to proof, further indicat-
ing that it was an opinion. Id.
The court finally discussed the statement that described Oilman as having
"no status within the profession," and found this statement to be opinion as
well. Id. at 989-92. The court based this decision on multiple factors, such as
the article's inclusion of factual statements ascribing some status to Ollman, and
a general concern for not abridging freedom of speech. Id. at 990-92.
124. See Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 226
(2d Cir. 1985); Konrath v. Williquette, 732 F. Supp. 973, 976 (W.D. Wis. 1990);
Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 359 (D. Colo. 1987); Stevens
v. Tillman, 661 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow
Jones & Co., 543 A.2d 313, 327 (Del. 1987); Yovino v. Fish, 27 Mass. App. Ct.
442, 447-48, 539 N.E.2d 548, 552 (1989); Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d
283, 292, 501 N.E.2d 550, 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1986); Scott v. News-
Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986); El Paso Times,
Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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the use of such disparate tests by the lower courts may have resulted in
inconsistent decisions among the states and the federal circuits in the
past, the abolishment of the opinion privilege and its replacement with
existing constitutional doctrine by Milkovich has imposed uniform stan-
dards for courts to follow in determining the actionability of a
statement.125
III. DIscusSION
The saga that became Milkovich began in 1974 when Michael
Milkovich was the wrestling coach at Maple Heights High School in
Ohio. During a wrestling match with another school, an altercation
erupted in which several people were injured.12 6 Milkovich and H. Don
Scott (the school superintendent) gave their account of events at the
match during a hearing on the incident held by the Ohio High School
Athletic Association (OHSAA). 12 7 Following the hearing, OHSAA sanc-
tioned the Maple Heights team.12 8 When parents and wrestlers sought
a restraining order against the sanctions in state court, Milkovich and
Scott testified once again as to the occurrences at the match.' 29 The
court overturned the sanctions on due process grounds.' 30
The next day, an article concerning the court hearing appeared in a
local newspaper owned by Lorain Journal Company. The article, au-
thored by J. Theodore Diadiun, was headed "Maple beat the law with
the 'big lie' " and contained the caption "TD Says."'' It stated that the
testimony which Scott and Milkovich presented at the OHSAA hearing
did not resemble the actual events at the wrestling match, and that Scott
and Milkovich altered their testimony to an even greater degree for the
court hearing.' 3 2 The relevant passages of the article read as follows:
... a lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student
125. For a discussion of the abolishment of the opinion privilege by
Milkovich and the standards that supplanted the privilege, see infra notes 146-64
and accompanying text.
126. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
127. Id.
128. Id. The sanctions included probation and ineligibility for the state
wrestling tournament. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The trial court held that the wrestling team's right to enter the
state competition constituted a property right, entitling it to due process prior to
deprivation of that right. Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143,
145, 416 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1979). Since OHSAA had failed to "safeguard" the
team's due process rights in effecting the disqualification, the trial court rein-
stated the team's eligibility for the state competition. Id.
131. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
132. Id. at 2699 n.2. Diadiun's article stated: "Any resemblance between
[the events at the match and the testimony at the OHSAA hearing] is purely
coincidental." Id. (quoting newspaper article). An OHSAA commissioner fur-
ther commented that Milkovich's and Scott's testimony in court "certainly
sounded different from what they told us." Id. (quoting newspaper article).
[Vol. 36: p. 647
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body of Maple Heights High School, and by anyone who at-
tended the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet of last Feb. 8.
A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year,
is well they learned early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can
sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making
the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly Maple wrestling
coach, Mike Milkovich, and former superintendent of schools,
H. Donald Scott.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple
Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that
Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given
his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learn-
ing from their high school administrators and coaches?
I think not.1 33
Milkovich's complaint contended that the article "accused [him] of
committing the crime of perjury .. .and damaged [him] directly in his
life-time occupation of coach and teacher and constituted libel per
se."'4
The case went up on appeal twice to the Ohio Supreme Court and
certiorari was denied twice by the United States Supreme Court.' 35 The
133. Id. at 2698 (quoting Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20,
21, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321-22 (1989)).
134. Id. at 2699-700.
135. Id. at 2700. When the action first appeared before the trial court, the
court found that Milkovich had not established actual malice and therefore
granted a directed verdict to Lorain Journal. Id. On appeal, the Ohio Court of
Appeals held that there was a jury issue as to actual malice, and it reversed and
remanded the case. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court then dismissed the appeal
because there was no "substantial constitutional question," and subsequently
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.
When the case came before the trial court the second time, it was dismissed
by summary judgment in favor of Lorain Journal. Id. The trial court gave alter-
native bases for its grant of summary judgment. The first basis was that the
article was constitutionally protected opinion under Gertz, and the second was
that Milkovich had not proved the requisite prima facie case of actual malice. Id.
While the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determinations, the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. The Ohio high court dis-
agreed with both of the trial court's findings. It held first that Milkovich was
neither a public figure nor a public official, and thus the actual malice standard
was inapplicable. Id. It then held that Diadiun's article consisted of factual as-
sertions, and was therefore not protected as opinion. Id. Once again, the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.
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Ohio Court of Appeals, however, eventually affirmed the trial court's
grant of Lorain Journal's motion for summary judgment.' 3 6 The ap-
peals court considered itself bound by the Ohio Supreme Court's deci-
sion, in a parallel action brought by superintendent Scott, that Diadiun's
article was constitutionally protected opinion. 137 When the Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed Milkovich's appeal, the United States
Supreme Court finally granted certiorari. 138
While Milkovich contended that Diadiun's article was libelous per
se in that it accused him of perjury and damaged him in his occupation,
LorainJournal argued that the article was opinion, and as such, was enti-
tled to "First Amendment-based protection."1 39 Lorain Journal urged
that in all defamation actions, "the First Amendment mandates an in-
quiry into whether a statement is 'opinion' or 'fact,' and that only the
latter statements may be actionable."'140
In a seven to two decision, the Court rejected LorainJournal's argu-
ment. The majority opinion (written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and in
On remand, the trial court once again granted summary judgment in favor
of Lorain Journal. For a discussion of the procedural history after the trial
court's action at this stage, see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
136. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
137. Id. In analyzing the statements at issue from the Diadiun article, the
Ohio Supreme Court adopted the four-factor test developed in Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). See Scott v. News-Her-
ald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706 (1986). For the text of the
statements at issue in Diadiun's article, see supra text accompanying note 133.
For a discussion of the Ollman test, see supra notes 117-24 and accompanying
text.
The Scott court first looked at the common meaning of the language in the
article, and found that although there was no express statement that Scott had
perjured himself, the clear implication of the language as it would commonly be
understood was that Scott had committed perjury. 25 Ohio St. 3d at 250-51,
496 N.E.2d at 706-07. The court next analyzed whether the statements were
verifiable, and concluded that a perjury action would provide a means for either
verifying or disproving Diadiun's statements. Id. at 251-52, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
The court then looked at the context of the article. It found the caption "TD
Says" and Diadiun's obvious "bias" against Milkovich and Scott to cause "the
average reader viewing the words in their internal context [to] be hard pressed
to accept Diadiun's statements as an impartial reporting of perjury." Id. at 252-
53, 496 N.E.2d at 707-08. Finally, the court concerned itself with the broader
context in which the article appeared-in a column on the sports page, "a tradi-
tional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole" where a reader would not
expect an author to "be particularly knowledgeable about . . .perjury." Id. at
253-54, 496 N.E.2d at 708. Thus, although the first two factors that the court
examined indicated that the statements were factual and actionable, the second
two factors caused the court to reach the opposite conclusion-that the article
was "constitutionally protected opinion." Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709. The
court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the newspaper. Id.
138. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990) (granting
certiorari).
139. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2699-700, 2705.
140. Id. at 2706.
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which Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia and Ken-
nedy joined) held that since existing constitutional doctrine adequately
protected statements of opinion, no separate opinion privilege was nec-
essary.141 It then went on to find the statements at issue in Milkovich to
be actionable.' 4 2
Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined, agreed
with the majority's statement of the law, but disagreed with its applica-
tion to the facts of the case. Justices Brennan and Marshall instead
found the statements to be protected under the constitutional doctrines
outlined by the majority.143
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis with a brief overview of
the history of defamation at common law, including the development of
the fair comment privilege,' 44 and he then traced the series of decisions
subjecting the law of defamation to first amendment restrictions.14 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist next addressed the issue before the Court-the
existence of, "in addition to the established safeguards discussed above,
still another First Amendment-based protection for defamatory state-
ments which are categorized as 'opinion' as opposed to 'fact.' "146
He first noted that the concept of a privilege for opinions stemmed
primarily from the dictum in Gertz that "there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its cor-
rection ... on the competition of other ideas."' 4 7 He found the "fair
meaning of the passage [to be] equat[ing] the word 'opinion' in the sec-
ond sentence with the word 'idea' in the first sentence." 1 48 Moreover,
"[u]nder this view, the language was merely a reiteration of Justice
Holmes' classic 'marketplace of ideas' concept,"' 49 and was not "in-
141. Id. at 2707. For a discussion of the majority's analysis in Milkovich, see
infra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
142. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707. For a discussion of the majority's appli-
cation of the law to the facts of the case, see infra notes 165-69 and accompany-
ing text.
143. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of the dissent's application of the law to the facts of the case, see infra notes
180-84 and accompanying text.
144. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702-03. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
defamation was developed to redress injuries to reputation, and for that reason,
at common law, a defamatory statement was actionable whether it was one of
fact or one of opinion. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist then explained that since the
common law was "unduly burdensome" and "could stifle valuable public de-
bate," the fair comment privilege originated to protect most statements on mat-
ters of public concern. Id. at 2703.
145. Id. at 2703-05.
146. Id. at 2705.
147. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974)).
148. Id.
149. Id. The "marketplace of ideas" concept derives from Justice Holmes'
statement that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
1991] NOTE 675
29
West: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. - Demise of the Opinion Privilege
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that
might be labeled 'opinion.' "150 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist
found the creation of such a "wholesale exemption" to be unnecessary,
because under extant case law statements of opinion were already ade-
quately protected in four ways.' 5 '
At this point in his analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth the
four protections offered by prior decisions of the Court. He first cited
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 15 2 as "stand[ing] for the proposition
that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false
before there can be liability ... at least ... where a media defendant is
involved," thus "ensur[ing] that a statement of opinion relating to mat-
ters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual con-
notation will receive full constitutional protection."'15 3 Second, Chief
the competition of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the marketplace of ideas
theory, see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv.
964, 967-81 (1978) (rejecting classic marketplace of ideas concept due to im-
plausible assumptions on which concept is based).
150. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705. The Court went on to state that "[n]ot
only would such an interpretation be contrary to the tenor and context of the
passage, but it would also ignore the fact that expressions of 'opinion' may often
imply an assertion of objective fact." Id.
151. Id. at 2706.
152. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Fora full discussion of Hepps, see supra notes 79-
83 and accompanying text.
153. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (emphasis added). The falsity require-
ment articulated in Hepps and reiterated in Milkovich does not change the estab-
lished requirement of the law of defamation that a statement must be false in
order to be actionable. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 34, § 2, at 3 (listing falsity as
an element of defamation); RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 558 (same). It does
change, however, the common law rules that dictate which party has the burden
of pleading and proving truth or falsity. At common law, the plaintiff had the bur-
den of pleading, but not of proving, falsity. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 34, § 5, at
25-26. Falsity was presumed, and truth was an affirmative defense that the de-
fendant bore the burden of pleading and proving. Id. at 26; id. § 63, at 323;
Franklin & Bussel, supra note 59, at 871. The common law began to change with
the introduction of the constitutional culpability requirements. In cases involv-
ing a public official, a public figure, or a matter of public concern in which the
plaintiff seeks punitive damages, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
acted with actual malice-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or
falsity. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public
official); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring in the result) (public figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 349 (1974) (private figure and matter of public concern). The actual malice
requirement has therefore necessitated that a plaintiff who must establish actual
malice must also, as a practical matter, establish the falsity of the statement at
issue, thus effectively transferring the burden of proving falsity to the plaintiff.
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 n.6 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986)); L. ELDREDGE, supra note 34, § 63, at 323-24 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 comment j (1977)); Franklin & Bussel,
supra note 59, at 855-56.
In cases where actual malice is not an element of an action for defamation,
however, it is less clear which party has the burden of proving truth or falsity.
[Vol. 36: p. 647676
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Justice Rehnquist cited Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v.
Bresler, 154 Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers
v. Austin 155 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwel 156 as cases providing
Gertz required a showing of some level of culpability, definable by each state, in
cases involving a private figure plaintiff where punitive or presumed damages
are not at issue, at least on matters of public concern. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
Hepps made it clear that in such cases, at least where a media defendant is in-
volved, the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768-69.
In cases that do not involve a media defendant, however, lower courts have split
on the issue of whether Gertz imposes a culpability requirement, and whether
Hepps requires the plaintiff to prove falsity. See Langvardt, Media Defendants, Pub-
lic Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defama-
tion Law, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 91, 100 n.57 (1987) (noting lower court split as to
whether Gertz applies to cases with nonmedia defendants); Franklin & Bussel,
supra note 59, at 858 (arguing that "placing the burden of proof [of truth] on the
defendant would permit the imposition of liability without fault," in contraven-
tion of Gertz). Compare Connolly v. Labowitz, 519 A.2d 138, 140 (Del. Super. Ct.
1986) (Supreme Court limited Hepps to media defendants, and "will be followed
here") with Cunningham v. United Nat'l Bank of Wash., 710 F. Supp. 861, 863
(D.D.C. 1989) (recognizing that jurisdiction has extended Hepps to nonmedia
defendants).
It appears, therefore, that there are two primary categories of cases in which
the Supreme Court has not mandated, through constitutional requirements con-
cerning culpability or proof of falsity, a change in the common law rule placing
the burden of proving truth on the defendant: cases involving a private figure
plaintiff on a matter of public concern with a nonmedia defendant, and cases
involving a private figure plaintiff on a matter not of public concern. In such
cases, states "will be free to apply their own rules, and they may or may not
continue to apply the traditional common law rule" placing the burden of plead-
ing and proving truth on the defendant. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 34, § 63, at
324 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 commentj (1977)). The
common law rule presuming falsity does not, of course, offer as much protection
to speech as does any rule that requires the plaintiff, directly or indirectly, to
prove falsity.
Any requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving that the de-
famatory statement is false essentially espouses the verifiability test used by
some lower courts to adjudicate defamation cases. For a discussion of the ver-
ifiability test, see supra notes 109-15.
154. 398 U.S. 6 (1970). For a discussion of Bresler, see supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
155. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). For a discussion of Letter Carriers, see supra note
95 and accompanying text.
156. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Falwell, Hustler magazine had published a par-
ody advertisement allegedly portraying respondent Jerry Falwell "and his
mother as drunk and immoral, and suggest[ing] that respondent is a hypocrite
who preaches only when he is drunk." Id. at 48. At trial, the court granted a
directed verdict in favor of Hustler on Falwell's invasion of privacy claim. Id. at
49. The jury found in favor of Hustler on Falwell's libel claim, on the basis that
"the ad parody could not 'reasonably be understood as describing actual facts
about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.' " Id. (quoting
Appendix to Petition for Certiorari). The jury did find in favor of Falwell on his
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, awarding him both compensa-
tory and punitive damages. Id. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed. Id. It held
that the actual malice standard of New York Times need not be met in an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim, and, furthermore, that the jury's de-
cision that the parody was an "opinion" and therefore protected by the first
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protection for statements of "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical
hyperbole" and other statements which cannot " 'reasonably be inter-
preted as stating actual facts' about an individual."' 15 7 Next, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist cited New York Times, 158 Butts' 5 9 and Gertz 160 as cases
espousing the requirement in defamation cases of some level of culpa-
bility, whether it be actual malice or some other level of fault established
by a state. 16 1 These cases, according to the majority, "further ensure
that debate on public issues remains 'uninhibited, robust and wide-
open.' "162 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist found "assurance that the
foregoing determinations will be made in a manner so as not to 'consti-
tute a forbidden intrusion [into] the field of free expression' " in Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.'sI63 requirement of in-
dependent appellate review of findings of actual malice. 164
In applying two of the above standards to the facts of the case at
bar, the Court first found that the statements at issue were sufficiently
factual to be actionable. 16 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the language
amendment was "irrelevant," since the issue concerned only "whether the [par-
ody] was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress." Id. at 49-50 (quoting Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1276 (4th Cir.
1986)). The Supreme Court rejected Falwell's contention that mere outra-
geousness would sustain a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
holding instead that public figures and public officials may not recover without
establishing that a parody "contains a false statement of fact which was made
with 'actual malice.' " Id. at 56. The Court accepted the finding of the court of
appeals that the parody "was not reasonably believable," and thus held that the
parody did not meet the Court's requirement that both falsity and malice be
shown. Id. at 57 (quoting Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1278). In the course of its decision,
the Court defined the nature of a parody as inherently "distorted" and "exag-
gerat[ed]." Id. at 53 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDGED TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 275 (2d ed. 1979)).
157. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
158. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a full discussion of New York Times, see supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
159. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). For a full discussion of Butts, see supra notes 65-
67 and accompanying text.
160. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a full discussion of Gertz, see supra notes 70-
72 and accompanying text.
161. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
162. Id. (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270). ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
in a footnote accompanying his consideration of the Hepps proof of falsity re-
quirement, emphasized that in cases involving a showing of the New York Times
actual malice standard, the plaintiff will necessarily bear the burden of showing
falsity. Id. at 2706 n.6. It is therefore logical to assume that when he later in the
opinion referred to the culpability requirements as a third protection for speech,
he was addressing the purpose they serve in dictating a finding offault, since he
had already discussed their role in compelling the plaintiff to provefalsity. For a
discussion of the effect of the culpability requirements on the burden of proving
falsity, see supra note 153.
163. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). For a full discussion of Bose, see supra notes 73-
75 and accompanying text.
164. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 499).
165. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist posed the question of "whether or not a
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in the column that Milkovich "lied at the hearing after.., having given
his solemn oath to tell the truth," and found this not to be the "sort of
loose, figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate the impres-
sion that the writer was seriously maintaining petitioner committed the
crime of perjury."1 66
The second standard applied by ChiefJustice Rehnquist in the ma-
jority opinion tested the verifiability of Diadiun's statement that
Milkovich lied. The Chief Justice found that "a core of objective evi-
dence" existed from which it could be determined, through a perjury
action, whether or not Milkovich lied.i 6 7 Specifically, Milkovich's testi-
mony before OHSAA could be compared to his testimony before the
trial court in order to verify the truth or falsity of his statements. t 68
Thus, Lorain Journal would be adequately protected if this comparison
proved the truth of its article.i69
Justice Brennan, who was joined in his dissent by Justice Marshall,
agreed with the majority that a separate privilege for statements of opin-
ion was not necessary.170 Justice Brennan "part[ed] company with the
Court," nevertheless, in its application of the law to the facts of the
case. 17 1 Justice Brennan maintained that the statements at issue were
eligible for "full constitutional protection" because they could not "rea-
sonably be interpreted as either stating or implying defamatory facts
about [Milkovich]."' 172
In the first part of his dissent, Justice Brennan implicitly criticized
the majority for not giving the lower courts more guidance in distin-
guishing between a statement that implies the existence of facts and a
statement that is based solely on the speaker's opinion. 17 3 In the sec-
ond part, Justice Brennan explained how he arrived at the conclusion
that the challenged statements in Milkovich did not imply a factual asser-
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun column
imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial pro-
ceeding," and concluded that a reasonable factfinder could so conclude. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 251, 496
N.E.2d 699, 707 (1986)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("With all of the above, I am es-
sentially in agreement.").
171. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("Diadiun not only reveals the facts upon which he is relying but he makes it
clear at which point he runs out of facts and is simply guessing.").
173. Id. at 2709-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan remarked
that "[t]he majority provides some general guidance for identifying when state-
ments of opinion imply assertions of fact. But it is a matter worthy of further
attention . I..." d  at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion. 174 He first dissected Diadiun's article. 17 5 According to Justice
Brennan, the article began with factual statements made by Diadiun
based on his first-hand observations at the wrestling match and the OH-
SAA hearing.' 76 Then, Diadiun began to "surmise" and draw conclu-
sions based on his stated observations. 177 Justice Brennan pointed to
the language of apparency that Diadiun used-words like "seemed,"
"probably" and "apparently"-which indicated that Diadiun was draw-
ing conclusions based on his own interpretation of facts. 178 Justice
Brennan further stated that Diadiun "fail[ed] to claim any firsthand
knowledge" in describing events at the court hearing in his article. 179
Justice Brennan concluded that the overall effect of the article
would not lead any reasonable reader to believe either that Milkovich
had actually perjured himself or that "Diadiun had further information
about Milkovich's court testimony on which his belief was based."' 8 0
Justice Brennan specified three findings upon which he based his con-
clusion. First, he stated that the column made it obvious that Diadiun
did not attend the court hearing, nor did he have "detailed secondhand
information" about Milkovich's testimony in court.18 ' Second, Justice
Brennan pointed to the fact that Diadiun's statement that Milkovich per-
jured himself was "preceded by the cautionary term 'apparently.' "182
He cited several cases to support the view that a statement which follows
cautionary language is less likely to be taken as fact by the reader, and is
thus less likely to be actionable.' 8 3 He finally concluded that the "tone
and format" of the article would not lead readers to expect it to be fac-
tual, thus also indicating that the statement would be nonactionable.i 8 4
In the third part of his dissent, Justice Brennan extolled the value to
174. Id. at 2710-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2711-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the text of the statements at
issue in Diadiun's article, see supra text accompanying note 133.
177. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting).
180. Id. (BrennanJ., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2711-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is plain from the column
that Diadiun did not attend the court hearing.").
182. Id. at 2712 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("an unmistakable sign that
Diadiun did not know what Milkovich had actually said in court").
183. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan first cited Oilman for the
proposition that "when the reasonable reader encounters cautionary language,
he tends to 'discount that which follows.' " Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). He then cited other
cases, along with parenthetical explanations of their significance. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2712-13 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan summarized
the tone of Diadiun's article as "pointed, exaggerated and heavily laden with
emotional rhetoric and moral outrage," making the article "obvious hyperbole."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He described the format of the article as a "signed
editorial column" in which "even the headline ... reminds readers that they are
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society of "conjecture," and concluded that "[p]unishing such conjec-
ture protects reputation only at the cost of expunging a genuinely useful
mechanism for public debate."' 185
The majority opinion did not respond to the dissent's characteriza-
tion of the challenged statements as protected conjecture, but merely
found the statements to imply a factual assertion and thus to be actiona-
ble.' 8 6 While the majority and dissent agreed that the existing constitu-
tional protections delineated by the majority were adequate to enable a
court to distinguish actionable statements from those that are nonac-
tionable, the different conclusions to which the majority and dissent
came foreshadow the difficulties that lower courts will likely face in ap-
plying the stated constitutional protections to the multitude of fact pat-
terns before them.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court abolished the "artificial dichotomy
between 'opinion' and fact," ' 8 7 while retaining the idea that a statement
is only actionable if it contains a certain undefined amount of factual
content.18 8 Rather than developing a test, per se, to be used in deciding
whether the requisite amount of factual content is present, the Court
held that freedom of expression "is adequately secured by existing con-
stitutional doctrine."' 8 9 While the Court eliminated the strict categori-
zation into terminology ("fact" or "opinion") that the lower courts had
previously used in determining whether a statement was an actionable
one ("fact") or an inactionable one ("opinion"), 190 it retained many of
the concepts which the lower courts had used in making their determi-
reading one man's commentary." Id. at 2713 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a
definition of hyperbole, see supra note 94.
185. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2715 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 2707.
187. Id. at 2706; see also id. at 2707 ("We are not persuaded that, in addition
to these protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion'
is required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment.").
188. See id. at 2706. The Court summarized this idea in several ways: "[A]
statement of opinion ... which does not contain a provably false factual conno-
tation will receive full constitutional protection," id.; and "statements that can-
not 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual" will
be protected. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50
(1988)).
189. Id.
190. For a discussion of Milkovich's abolishment of the opinion privilege,
see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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nations 191 and grouped them into a four-part analysis.' 92 It is apparent
that the Supreme Court did not intend the constitutional doctrine which
it set forth to be used as a bright-line checklist for lower courts to follow,
but rather intended it as a more general statement of policy considera-
tions. The Court expected lower courts to use the four protections dis-
junctively-so that if a statement is shielded by any one of the
protections, it will not be actionable. Nonetheless, since the lower
courts are accustomed to using bright-line checklists of a more conjunc-
tive nature in determining the actionability of defamatory statements,
they may attempt to utilize the constitutional doctrine articulated in
Milkovich as such a checklist. Therefore, the "existing constitutional
doctrine" which the Court attempted to simplify into four protections
may be a dangerous tool in the hands of lower courts that venture to use
Milkovich as a checklist rather than reading the opinion thoughtfully.
In essence, it is the first two Milkovich protections (requiring a state-
ment to be provable as false and capable of interpretation as stating
facts) that determine whether or not a particular statement has enough
factual content to be actionable. While a showing of the third protection
(requiring some form of culpability) will be necessary in limited situa-
tions, such a showing does nothing towards deciding the threshold issue
of whether the statement is sufficiently factual to be actionable.' 9 3 The
fourth protection (requiring independent appellate review of findings of
actual malice) would also be wholly inapplicable in determining action-
ability based on factual content. Thus, the first two protections alone
determine the initial actionability of the statement.
Exclusive reliance on. these first two protections poses a serious
191. For example, the first existing constitutional protection cited by the
Court (that the statement must be provable as false in order for an action to lie)
is merely a rearticulation of the verifiability test that the lower courts had previ-
ously used. For a discussion of the verifiability test, see supra notes 109-15 and
accompanying text. Additionally, the second doctrine which the Court set forth(that the statement must be able to be reasonably interpreted as stating facts) is
akin to the test used in Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54,
63 (2d Cir. 1980), of whether the statement is so "laden with factual content" as
to be actionable.
192. For a discussion of the four constitutional protections enumerated in
Milkovich, see supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
193. The Milkovich Court did not even address the issue of culpability(here, actual malice) in its factual examination of the case. The culpability re-
quirements will have an indirect effect on the first protection (requiring the
plaintiff to bear the burden of proving falsity), as the Court noted. Milkovich,
110 S. Ct. at 2706 n.6. The reference to culpability in the third protection, how-
ever, goes to the effect of the culpability requirements on fault, not falsity. For a
discussion of the effect of the culpability requirements on the burden of proof of
falsity, see supra note 153. For a discussion of the third protection's focus on
fault rather than on falsity, see supra note 162. For a discussion of the cases that
the Milkovich Court cited as embodying culpability requirements, see supra notes
158-60 and accompanying text. For a summary of the culpability requirements,
see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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problem, however, in that they involve fluid, subjective concepts, mak-
ing them difficult to apply. The fact that the majority and dissent in
Milkovich agreed on the law, but disagreed on the application of the law
to the facts, illustrates graphically the potential problems which lower
courts will face in applying the concepts from Milkovich. 19 4
The second protection, in particular, could be problematic. The
difficulty arises because, in a literal reading of the language used by the
Court, the second protection appears to contain two separate classes of
protected statements: (1) "statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] in-
terpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual,"' 19 5 and (2) state-
ments of "imaginative expression" or "rhetorical hyperbole."' 196
Although the Court ostensibly was not suggesting that these be treated
as separate classes, both of which a statement would need to fulfill in
order to satisfy the second protection, a court that implements a check-
list approach to Milkovich could readily so interpret the Court's lan-
guage. The two classes will often overlap, such as they did in the Bresler-
Letter Carriers-Falwell ine of cases cited by the Milkovich Court. 19 7 In Let-
ter Carriers, for example, the use of the word "traitor" in an article defin-
ing "scabs," or people who refused to join a union, was not interpreted
as stating actual facts about the individual, and the word was easily la-
beled hyperbole rather than a literal use of language. 198 Thus, both fac-
tors in the second protection were consistent in indicating the statement
to be nonactionable.
It is possible, however, that a case could arise in which the state-
ment at issue does not state actual facts about an individual, yet is not
hyperbole. In such a case, a court reading Milkovich literally and em-
ploying a checklist approach would find that the two factors of the sec-
ond protection conflict in that they each counsel a different outcome.
For instance, consider under the second protection an example given by
the Milkovich Court to demonstrate a statement that would not be prova-
ble as false under thefirst protection (relating to verifiability) and thus
not actionable: "In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal igno-
194. ForJustice Brennan's statement in dissent that he agrees with the ma-
jority's articulation of the law, see supra note 170. For a discussion of the major-
ity's views of the Milkovich facts, see supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the dissenting views on the Milkovich facts, see supra notes
180-84 and accompanying text.
195. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
196. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-55
(1988)). The Milkovich Court later used the phrase "loose, figurative or hyper-
bolic language." Id. at 2707. For a definition of hyperbole, see supra note 94.
197. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. For a discussion of Bresler, see supra note
94 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Letter Carriers, see supra note 95
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Falwell, see supra note 156.
198. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Aus-
tin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974). For a discussion of Letter Carriers, see supra
note 95 and accompanying text.
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rance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin .. . ."199 A court
might justifiably find that although the statement that Mayor Jones dis-
plays "abysmal ignorance" does not state an actual fact, neither is the
language in the same "loose, figurative" sense as calling someone a trai-
tor or a blackmailer. Thus, each factor in the second protection would
result in a different outcome on the question of actionability. A court,
when faced with a situation in which the two factors of the second pro-
tection conflict, might then require further analysis in order to make a
determination as to whether or not the statement is sufficiently factual to
be actionable. Application of the first Milkovich protection could then
provide the weight necessary to tip the balance toward a finding of ac-
tionability or nonactionability.
In order to understand the potential effect of the first Milkovich pro-
tection on the second Milkovich protection, it is necessary to begin by
examining the first protection in isolation. In relation to the first protec-
tion, the Milkovich Court cited Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps as
"stand[ing] for the proposition that a statement on matters of public
concern must be provable as false before there can be liability ... [for]
defamation . . . where a media defendant is involved. ' '200 The Court
further stated that the statement at issue must also be provable as false
in cases where the plaintiff is a public official or a public figure. 20 1 This
is essentially a restatement of the verifiability test, requiring that a state-
ment be provable as false in order to be actionable, which lower courts
had used in the past.20 2 The Court in Milkovich, however, clearly and
deliberately limited this protection's applicability to cases involving a
public official or public figure plaintiff, or a matter of public concern and
a media defendant. 20 3
199. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. In this example,"it is implicit that Mayor
Jones does in fact follow the teachings of Marx and Lenin. The part of the state-
ment referring to this as fact would thus not give rise to an action for defama-
tion. Rather, at issue is the defamatory nature of the statement that he displays
"abysmal ignorance" due to his beliefs.
200. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986)).
201. Id. at 2706 n.6. Statements in such cases would need to be provable as
false due to the requirement of actual malice, which necessitates that the plaintiff
establish falsity. For a discussion of the effect of the culpability requirements on
the burden of proving falsity, see supra note 153.
202. For a discussion of the verifiability test, see supra notes 109-15 and
accompanying text.
203. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 n.6. The Milkovich Court noted that "[iln
Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases involving nonmedia defendants,
and accordingly we do the same." Id. (citation omitted). Lower courts have split
on the issue of whether cases in which there is a private figure plaintiff, a matter
of public concern and a defendant who is not a member of the media are gov-
erned by Hepps and Gertz. For a discussion of the lower court split, see supra note
153. Until such time as the Supreme Court explicitly rules on the applicability of
Hepps to cases involving nonmedia defendants, courts may arguably choose not
to apply the first protection of Milkovich to such cases. Various commentators
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The first protection would come into play in the "MayorJones" hy-
pothetical posited above, as the mayor would be a public official. While
it is arguable that his ignorance per se could be proved or disproved by
a test on current events or the like, this would have no effect on the
hypothetical. Under the first protection, the Mayor's "abysmal igno-
rance" would not be provable as false, because a showing of verifiability
would need to show not that MayorJones is ignorant, but rather that it is
his acceptance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin which renders him
ignorant. Since there would necessarily be no way to prove this to be
false, the application of the first protection of Milkovich would result in
this statement being inactionable.
When the second protection is brought back into the analysis and
applied to the hypothetical in conjunction with the first protection, the
results are mixed. Under the first factor of the second protection (which
concerns the statement of actual facts) the statement would be judged
one which is not sufficiently factual to be actionable. Under the second
factor of the second protection, on the other hand, the language used is
not that of rhetoric or hyperbole, indicating factual content and hence
actionability. The weight of the combined first and second protections,
therefore, would be in favor of declaring the statement to be not action-
able due to lack of factual content. In other words, the perceived con-
flict between the two factors of the second protection would be resolved
in favor of inactionability by the introduction of the first protection into
the analysis.
A different outcome is seen if the hypothetical situation is slightly
varied so that instead of referring to "Mayor Jones," the hypothetical
involves a person writing to his friend, "In my opinion my neighbor
Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx
and Lenin." This slight variation arguably renders the first protection
inapplicable, as it does not involve a public official or a public figure, or
a matter of public concern and a media defendant. 20 4 The second pro-
tection, therefore, becomes the sole determinative factor in ascertaining
initial actionability, and the situation described above in which the two
factors of the second protection conflict remains problematic for lower
courts that treat Milkovich as a bright-line checklist.2 0 5
Not only will the uncertainty that courts face in applying the princi-
ples articulated in Milkovich pose difficulties for the courts and for liti-
have urged, however, the rejection of any media/nonmedia distinction. See, e.g.,
Langvardt, supra note 153, at 117-23 (proposing reasons for eliminating me-
dia/nonmedia distinction).
204. For a discussion of the Milkovich Court's limitation of the first protec-
tion to cases involving public officials, public figures or matters of public con-
cern and media defendants, see supra note 203 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of the reasons why the third and fourth protections
are not applicable in determining whether a statement contains sufficient factual
content to be actionable, see supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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gants, but it will also have an impact on journalists. Prior to Milkovich,
one pair of commentators lamented the difficulties that journalists faced:
"Unfortunately, even the protection for rhetorical hyperbole leaves edi-
tors in a quandry. . . [Elditors cannot be sure when the word 'liar,'
without supporting facts, will be protected as rhetorical hyperbole or
unprotected for implying undisclosed false defamatory facts." '20 6 Be-
cause, as discussed above, such a determination remains a part of the
law of defamation even after Milkovich (which also involved a journalist),
journalists and editors still face the same problems in making publica-
tion decisions based on estimates of potential liability as they did in the
pre-Milkovich years. Thus, it appears that due to the inherent uncertain-
ties in the Milkovich holding, the law of defamation will remain difficult
to apply and predict.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to Milkovich, the lower courts were accustomed to determining
the actionability of a statement through a variety of specific tests.
Although it remains uncertain how the courts will incorporate Milkovich
into their existing jurisprudence, it is possible that they will attempt to
break the constitutional doctrines down into a more easily applied
bright-line test. The attendant difficulties in such an approach, as dis-
cussed, may be avoided if lower courts make a conscious effort to apply
the spirit of the Milkovich decision rather than to apply the letter of the
decision by reducing it to its components. The Court's purpose in all of
its defamation cases since New York Times has been to effectuate a "na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'20 7 The Milkovich decision is in-
tended to carry out that policy without creating an "artificial dichotomy
between 'opinion' and fact."'20 8 In attempting to provide a method by
which lower courts may distinguish between cases that are actionable
and those that are not, the Supreme Court has devised an analysis which
inherently generates a great deal of uncertainty rather than easily ob-
tained answers. The lower courts, in order to effectuate the Supreme
Court's stated policy of establishing a broad scope of protected speech,
should resolve these uncertainties in favor of protecting the speech at
206. Trager & Chamberlin, supra note 52, at 62. The authors suggested
that the uncertainties which journalists faced at that time could be alleviated if
the courts would simply merge two existing concepts in the law of defamation:
the concept of verifiability and the constitutional doctrine in Hepps that the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving falsity in a defamation action. Id. at 63. They
believed that under this formulation "a statement would be actionable if a plain-
tiff could establish ... that it was based on false fact-laden assertions." Id. The
authors' assertion that such an approach would alleviate the existing difficulties
is unconvincing, however, in light of the fact that they did not offer any proof or
substantiation for their conclusions.
207. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
208. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
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issue. Lower courts should be cautious not to allow their uncertainty to
lead to findings that the speech is factual and thus actionable in cases
where a finding of nonactionability is not clearly mandated by Milkovich
due to the absence of a bright-line directive. If increased findings of
actionability are indeed the outcome in the wake of Milkovich, the Court
may find a need to promulgate a different test which would result in
clearer outcomes and provide the" 'breathing space' which 'freedoms of
expression require in order to survive.' ",209
Lisa K West
209. Id. (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S 767, 772
(1986)).
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